Related papers: A Two-Ball Ellsberg Paradox: An Experiment
Behavioral experiments on the Ultimatum Game have shown that we human beings have remarkable preference in fair play, contradicting the predictions by the game theory. Most of the existing models seeking for explanations, however, strictly…
We give elementary examples within a framework for studying decisions under uncertainty where probabilities are only roughly known. The framework, in gambling terms, is that the size of a bet is proportional to the gambler's perceived…
Ambiguity is an intrinsic feature of natural language. Managing ambiguity is a key part of human language understanding, allowing us to anticipate misunderstanding as communicators and revise our interpretations as listeners. As language…
Challenge Theory (Shye & Haber 2015; 2020) has demonstrated that a newly devised challenge index (CI) attributable to every binary choice problem predicts the popularity of the bold option, the one of lower probability to gain a higher…
Common research tasks ask students to identify a correct answer and justify their answer choice. We propose expanding the array of research tasks to access different knowledge that students might have. By asking students to discuss answers…
In the classical Approximate Majority problem with two opinions there are agents with Opinion 1 and with Opinion 2. The goal is to reach consensus and to agree on the majority opinion if the bias is sufficiently large. It is well known that…
Is an option especially tempting when it is both immediate and certain? I test the effect of risk on the present-bias factor given quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In my experiment workers allocate about thirty to fifty minutes of real-effort…
The host of a game presents two indistinguishable envelopes to an agent. One of the envelopes is randomly selected and allocated to the agent. The agent is informed that the monetary content of one of the envelopes is twice that of the…
In economics, risk aversion is modeled via a concave Bernoulli utility within the expected-utility paradigm. We propose a simple test of expected utility and concavity. We find little support for either: only 30 percent of the choices are…
As we know, there is a controversy about the decision making under risk between economists and psychologists. We discuss to build a unified theory of risky choice, which would explain both of compensatory and non-compensatory theories. For…
Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017) propose the Off-Switch Game, a model of Human-AI cooperation in which AI agents always defer to humans because they are uncertain about our preferences. I explain two reasons why AI agents might not defer.…
When people pursue rewards in stochastic environments, they often match their choice frequencies to the observed target frequencies, even when this policy is demonstrably sub-optimal. We used a ``hide and seek'' task to evaluate this…
Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure…
The rational solution of the Monty Hall problem unsettles many people. Most people, including the authors, think it feels wrong to switch the initial choice of one of the three doors, despite having fully accepted the mathematical proof for…
Cheng (2025) establishes that in a persuasion game where both the sender and the receiver have Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences, the sender never strictly benefits from using ambiguous communication strategies over standard…
We provide a theoretical framework to understand how widely used measures of choice difficulty relate. In a binary-option Bayesian expected-utility framework, we show that three measures of difficulty, (i) understanding (ex-ante value),…
We study variants of a stochastic game inspired by backgammon where players may propose to double the stake, with the game state dictated by a one-dimensional random walk. Our variants allow for different numbers of proposals and different…
We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
Recent studies claim that human behavior in a two-armed Bernoulli bandit (TABB) task is described by positivity and confirmation biases, implying that humans do not integrate new information objectively. However, we find that even if the…