Related papers: Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwis…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
The Conditional Preference Network (CP-net) graphically represents user's qualitative and conditional preference statements under the ceteris paribus interpretation. The constrained CP-net is an extension of the CP-net, to a set of…
Preference cycles are prevalent in problems of decision-making, and are contradictory when preferences are assumed to be transitive. This contradiction underlies Condorcet's Paradox, a pioneering result of Social Choice Theory, wherein…
We study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information about the preferences of the agents is given as input. In…
Ranking and comparing items is crucial for collecting information about preferences in many areas, from marketing to politics. The Mallows rank model is among the most successful approaches to analyse rank data, but its computational…
There is a class of models for pol/mil/econ bargaining and conflict that is loosely based on the Median Voter Theorem which has been used with great success for about 30 years. However, there are fundamental mathematical limitations to…
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
In multi-objective decision planning and learning, much attention is paid to producing optimal solution sets that contain an optimal policy for every possible user preference profile. We argue that the step that follows, i.e, determining…
Conjoint experiments randomize multidimensional profiles, offering a powerful design for recovering structural preference parameters -- including marginal rates of substitution, willingness to pay, and the distribution of preferences across…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…
Differential privacy (DP) is a mathematical privacy notion increasingly deployed across government and industry. With DP, privacy protections are probabilistic: they are bounded by the privacy budget parameter, $\epsilon$. Prior work in…
We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies ex-post non-wastefulness and…
We introduce stochastic decision Petri nets (SDPNs), which are a form of stochastic Petri nets equipped with rewards and a control mechanism via the deactivation of controllable transitions. Such nets can be translated into Markov decision…
To model combinatorial decision problems involving uncertainty and probability, we introduce stochastic constraint programming. Stochastic constraint programs contain both decision variables (which we can set) and stochastic variables…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
We study group decision making with changing preferences as a Markov Decision Process. We are motivated by the increasing prevalence of automated decision-making systems when making choices for groups of people over time. Our main…
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…