Related papers: Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwis…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of $m$ alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard implies that there…
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the voters' preferences over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. In a seminal result, Gibbard (1977) has characterized the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with…
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…
A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated to the agents. In 2001, Bogomolnaia and Moulin presented the probabilistic serial…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather…
For assignment problems where agents, specifying ordinal preferences, are allocated indivisible objects, two widely studied randomized mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). These two…
In order to represent the preferences of a group of individuals, we introduce Probabilistic CP-nets (PCP-nets). PCP-nets provide a compact language for representing probability distributions over preference orderings. We argue that they are…
Eliciting preferences from human judgements is inherently imprecise, yet most decision analysis methods force a single priority vector from pairwise comparisons, discarding the information embedded in inconsistencies. We instead leverage…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…
Ranking alternatives is a natural way for humans to explain their preferences. It is being used in many settings, such as school choice, course allocations and residency matches. In some cases, several `items' are given to each participant.…
Preferences play a key role in determining what goals/constraints to satisfy when not all constraints can be satisfied simultaneously. In this paper, we study how to synthesize preference satisfying plans in stochastic systems, modeled as…
There is a growing need for discrete choice models that account for the complex nature of human choices, escaping traditional behavioral assumptions such as the transitivity of pairwise preferences. Recently, several parametric models of…
We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that…
Sequential Social Dilemmas (SSDs) provide a key framework for studying how cooperation emerges when individual incentives conflict with collective welfare. In Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning, these problems are often addressed by…
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for the desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and…
The pairwise winning indices, computed in the Stochastic Multicriteria Acceptability Analysis, give the probability with which an alternative is preferred to another taking into account all the instances of the assumed preference model…
An agent's preferences depend on an ordered parameter or type. We characterize the set of utility functions with single-crossing differences (SCD) in convex environments. These include preferences over lotteries, both in expected utility…