Related papers: The Impact of Selfish Behavior in Load Balancing G…
We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.…
Suppose that a set of $m$ tasks are to be shared as equally as possible amongst a set of $n$ resources. A game-theoretic mechanism to find a suitable allocation is to associate each task with a ``selfish agent'', and require each agent to…
We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS…
In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…
Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…
This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The…
We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…
Selfish routing is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, with one of the principal applications being that of routing in road networks. Inspired by the emergence of routing technologies and autonomous driving, we revisit selfish…
We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a…
There has been substantial progress on finding game-theoretic equilibria. Most of that work has focused on games with finite, discrete action spaces. However, many games involving space, time, money, and other fine-grained quantities have…
Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…
In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network systems, content (object) delivery between nodes is often required. One way to study such a distributed system is by defining games, which involve selfish nodes that make strategic choices on replicating…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
Coordination in multiplayer games enables players to avoid the lose-lose outcome that often arises at Nash equilibria. However, designing a coordination mechanism typically requires the consideration of the joint actions of all players,…
This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…