Related papers: Equilibria of Attacker-Defender Games

We introduce a way to compare actions in decision problems. One action is safer than another if the set of beliefs at which the decision-maker prefers the safer action expands as the decision-maker becomes more risk averse. We provide a…

This article adopts game theory to build a model for explaining the predation behavior of animals.We assume that both the prey and the preydator have two stratigies in this game,the active one and the passive one.By calculating the outcome…

We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph,…

In this paper we consider a Target-guarding differential game where the Defender must protect a linearly moving line segment by intercepting the Attacker who tries to reach it. In contrast to common Target-guarding problems, we assume that…

The active target defense differential game is addressed in this paper. In this differential game an Attacker missile pursues a Target aircraft. The aircraft is however aided by a Defender missile launched by, say, the wingman, to intercept…

Exploring new ideas is a fundamental aspect of research and development (R\&D), which often occurs in competitive environments. Most ideas are subsequent, i.e. one idea today leads to more ideas tomorrow. According to one approach, the best…

The "War of Attrition" is a classical game theoretic model that was first introduced to mathematically describe certain non-violent animal behavior. The original setup considers two participating players in a one-shot game competing for a…

We consider a variant of the target defense problem where a single defender is tasked to capture a sequence of incoming intruders. The intruders' objective is to breach the target boundary without being captured by the defender. As soon as…

A scenario is considered wherein a stationary, turn constrained agent (Turret) and a mobile agent (Defender) cooperate to protect the former from an adversarial mobile agent (Attacker). The Attacker wishes to reach the Turret prior to…

In this paper, we present exploitability descent, a new algorithm to compute approximate equilibria in two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information, by direct policy optimization against worst-case opponents. We prove…

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…

Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack, as well as…

In this paper, we consider a target defense game in which the attacker team seeks to reach a high-value target while the defender team seeks to prevent that by capturing them away from the target. To address the curse of dimensionality, a…

It is known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that…

Host-pathogen interactions consist of an attack by the pathogen, frequently a defense by the host and possibly a counter-defense by the pathogen. Here, we present a game-theoretical approach to describing such interactions. We consider a…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

In this work, we investigate a security game between an attacker and a defender, originally proposed in \cite{emadi2019security}. As is well known, the combinatorial nature of security games leads to a large cost matrix. Therefore,…

Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect…

We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…

Ensuring the security of networked systems is a significant problem, considering the susceptibility of modern infrastructures and technologies to adversarial interference. A central component of this problem is how defensive resources…