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We study dynamic mechanism design in a pure-exchange economy with privately observed idiosyncratic income. In the standard infinitely lived hidden-income benchmark of Green (1987) and Thomas-Worrall (1990), constrained-efficient allocations…
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this problem from the perspective of a broker, in a regret…
In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and…
Combining two or more items and selling them as one good, a practice called bundling, can be a very effective strategy for reducing the costs of producing, marketing, and selling goods. In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue…
Trade-offs between accuracy and efficiency pervade law, public health, and other non-computing domains, which have developed policies to guide how to balance the two in conditions of uncertainty. While computer science also commonly studies…
This paper explores the gain maximization problem of two nations engaging in non-cooperative bilateral trade. Probabilistic model of an exchange of commodities under different price systems is considered. Volume of commodities exchanged…
We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…
Minimizing execution costs for large orders is a fundamental challenge in finance. Firms often depend on brokers to manage their trades due to limited internal resources for optimizing trading strategies. This paper presents a methodology…
This paper studies a durable goods monopoly with multiple provision levels, free disposability, and zero marginal cost. We establish a Folk-Theorem-type result: as parties become sufficiently patient, equilibrium seller payoffs contains an…
The paper provides consistent mathematical framework for seminal Tiebout free-mobility model (1956). Our setting supports continuum of consumers with multidimensional preferences and finite number of strategic public good providers. We…
A dynamical model is introduced for the formation of a bullish or bearish trends driving an asset price in a given market. Initially, each agent decides to buy or sell according to its personal opinion, which results from the combination of…
We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…
We introduce an interactive market setup with sequential auctions where agents receive variegated signals with a known deadline. The effects of differential information and mutual learning on the allocation of overall profit \& loss (P\&L)…
In online bilateral trade, a platform posts prices to incoming pairs of buyers and sellers that have private valuations for a certain good. If the price is lower than the buyers' valuation and higher than the sellers' valuation, then a…
In the conventional principal-agent problem, a principal delegates a task to an agent and formulates a contract to incentivize the agent's actions on behalf of the principal. However, this framework overlooks the information that is…
With recent development of artificial intelligence, it is more common to adopt AI agents in economic activities. This paper explores the economic actions of agents, including human agents and AI agents, in an economic game of trading…
Two agents trade an item in a simultaneous offer setting, where the exchange takes place if and only if the buyer's bid price weakly exceeds the seller's ask price. Each agent is randomly assigned the buyer or seller role. Both agents are…
Achieving consensus among noncooperative agents remains challenging in decentralized multi-agent systems, where agents often have conflicting preferences. Existing coordination methods enable agents to reach consensus without a centralized…
We examine information structure design, also called "persuasion" or "signaling", in the presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a…
We investigate opportunistic cooperation between unlicensed secondary users and legacy primary users in a cognitive radio network. Specifically, we consider a model of a cognitive network where a secondary user can cooperatively transmit…