Related papers: Efficiency with(out) intermediation in repeated bi…
In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…
The distribution of efficient individuals in the economy and the efforts that they will put in if they are hired, there are two important concerns for a technologically advanced firm. wants to open a new branch. The firm does not have…
The growing integration of renewable energy sources necessitates adequate reserve capacity to maintain power balance. However, in market clearing, power companies with flexible resources may submit strategic bids to maximize profits,…
Strategic information is valuable either by remaining private (for instance if it is sensitive) or, on the other hand, by being used publicly to increase some utility. These two objectives are antagonistic and leaking this information might…
We consider a pair of traders in a market where the information available to the second trader is a strict subset of the information available to the first trader. The traders make prices based on the information available concerning a…
Resource distribution is a fundamental problem in economic and policy design, particularly when demand and supply are not naturally aligned. Without regulation, wealthier individuals may monopolize this resource, leaving the needs of others…
We examine fixed-price mechanisms in bilateral trade through the lens of regret minimization. Our main results are twofold. (i) For independent values, a near-optimal $\widetilde{\Theta}(T^{2/3})$ tight bound for $\textsf{Global Budget…
Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
A seller offers an asset in a decentralised market. Buyers have private signals about their common value. I study whether the market becomes allocatively more efficient with (i) more buyers, (ii) better-informed buyers. Both increase the…
I construct a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a…
We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length $n$, are decided in an adversarial, online…
We study whether a social planner can improve the efficiency of learning, measured by the expected total welfare loss, in a sequential decision-making environment. Agents arrive in order and each makes a binary action based on their private…
This paper examines the role of algorithmic trading in modern financial markets. Additionally, order types, characteristics, and special features of algorithmic trading are described under the lens provided by the large development of high…
We consider the age-old problem of allocating items among different agents in a way that is efficient and fair. Two papers, by Dolev et al. and Ghodsi et al., have recently studied this problem in the context of computer systems. Both…
A constrained informationally efficient market is defined to be one whose price process arises as the outcome of some equilibrium where agents face restrictions on trade. This paper investigates the case of short sale constraints, a setting…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
We develop a cross-border market model for two countries based on a continuous trading mechanism, in which the transmission capacities that enable transactions between market participants from different countries are limited. Our market…
Strategic customer behavior is strongly influenced by the level of information that is provided to customers. Hence, to optimize the design of queueing systems, many studies consider various versions of the same service model and compare…