Related papers: FEN-Hedonic Games with Distance-Based Preferences
The additively separable hedonic game (ASHG) is a model of coalition formation games on graphs. In this paper, we intensively and extensively investigate the computational complexity of finding several desirable solutions, such as a Nash…
In applied game theory the motivation of players is a key element. It is encoded in the payoffs of the game form and often based on utility functions. But there are cases were formal descriptions in the form of a utility function do not…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hope of successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible…
We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…
In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a…
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic,…
Knockout tournaments, also known as single-elimination or cup tournaments, are a popular form of sports competitions. In the standard probabilistic setting, for each pairing of players, one of the players wins the game with a certain (a…
We study games of chance (e.g., pokers, dices, horse races) in the form of agents' first-order posterior beliefs about game outcomes. We ask for any profile of agents' posterior beliefs, is there a game that can generate these beliefs? We…
The probabilistic bisimilarity distance of Deng et al. has been proposed as a robust quantitative generalization of Segala and Lynch's probabilistic bisimilarity for probabilistic automata. In this paper, we present a characterization of…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
Coalition forming is investigated among countries, which are coupled with short range interactions, under the influence of external fields produced by the existence of global alliances. The model rests on the natural model of coalition…
This paper studies a significant problem in green networking called switching off base stations in case of cooperating service providers by means of stochastic geometric and coalitional game tools. The coalitional game herein considered is…
With the development of artificial intelligence, human beings are increasingly interested in human-agent collaboration, which generates a series of problems about the relationship between agents and humans, such as trust and cooperation.…
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
We study how stability can be maintained even after any set of at most k players leave their groups, in the context of hedonic games. While stability properties ensure an outcome to be robust against players' deviations, it has not been…
We consider an operatorial model of alliances between three political parties which interact with their electors, with the undecided voters, and with the electors of the other parties. This extends what was done in a previous paper, where…
We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…