Related papers: FEN-Hedonic Games with Distance-Based Preferences

We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by increasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added…

This paper studies the Nash stability in hedonic coalition formation games. We address the following issue: for a general problem formulation, is there any utility allocation method ensuring a Nash-stable partition? We propose the…

Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…

This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…

We study strategic location choice by customers and sellers, termed the Bakers and Millers Game in the literature. In our generalized setting, each miller can freely choose any location for setting up a mill, while each baker is restricted…

Positional games are a branch of combinatorics, researching a variety of two-player games, ranging from popular recreational games such as Tic-Tac-Toe and Hex, to purely abstract games played on graphs and hypergraphs. It is closely…

This work shows that the formation of a finite number of coalitions in a nonatomic network congestion game benefits everyone. At the equilibrium of the composite game played by coalitions and individuals, the average cost to each coalition…

This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…

This study provides a model of cyber deception with asymmetric recognition represented by private beliefs. Signaling games, which are often used in existing works, are built on the implicit premise that the receiver's belief is public…

We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which…

Many settings of interest involving humans and machines -- from virtual personal assistants to autonomous vehicles -- can naturally be modelled as principals (humans) delegating to agents (machines), which then interact with each other on…

A number of model-comparison games central to (finite) model theory, such as pebble and Ehrenfeucht-Fra\"{i}ss\'{e} games, can be captured as comonads on categories of relational structures. In particular, the coalgebras for these comonads…

Algorithmic content targeting homogenizes information, with implications for strategic interactions. For example, this increased homogenization was arguably responsible for the run on the Silicon Valley Bank. We argue that existing measures…

We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…

Past efforts to classify impartial three-player combinatorial games (the theories of Li and Straffin) have made various restrictive assumptions about the rationality of one's opponents and the formation and behavior of coalitions. One may…

We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…

In this paper we extend some recent results on an operatorial approach to the description of alliances between political parties interacting among themselves and with a basin of electors. In particular, we propose and compare three…

We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…

In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…