Related papers: Inverse maximum theorems and some consequences
We begin by reviewing and proving the basic facts of combinatorial game theory. We then consider scoring games (also known as Milnor games or positional games), focusing on the "fixed-length" games for which all sequences of play terminate…
To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete…
In this work, we introduce graphical modelsfor multi-player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An n-player game is given by an undirected graph on n nodes and a set of n local…
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear-quadratic discrete-time dynamic non-cooperative games. Given feedback laws of players that are known to be a Nash equilibrium pair for a discrete-time linear system, we…
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support…
Kuhn's Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrate the limits…
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
Nash equilibrium} (NE) can be stated as a formal theorem on a multilinear form, free of game theory terminology. On the other hand, inspired by this formalism, we state and prove a {\it multilinear minimax theorem}, a generalization of von…
In this paper, we consider Mean Field Games in the presence of common noise relaxing the usual independence assumption of individual random noise. We assume a simple linear model with terminal cost satisfying a convexity and a weak…
The term rational has become synonymous with maximizing expected payoff in the definition of the best response in Nash setting. In this work, we consider stochastic games in which players engage only once, or at most a limited number of…
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…
We study the long-term behavior of the fictitious play process in repeated extensive-form games of imperfect information with perfect recall. Each player maintains incorrect beliefs that the moves at all information sets, except the one at…
We introduce language-based games, a generalization of psychological games [6] that can also capture reference-dependent preferences [7]. The idea is to extend the domain of the utility function to situations, maximal consistent sets in…
In a recent paper, Eisert et al. presented a quantum mechanical generalization of Prisoner's Dilemma. They asserted that the maximally entangled game exhibits a unique Nash equilibrium which yields a pay-off equivalent to cooperative…
This gives two existence results of alpha-core solutions by introducing P-open conditions and strong P-open conditions into games without ordered preferences. The existence of alpha-core solutions is obtained for games with…
In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves…
We extend the concept of meta-Nash equilibrium, introduced by Eshaghi Gordji and Bagha [2026] for complete-information games, to environments with incomplete information. We define a meta-Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a profile of…
Recently, the paper [12] introduces a derivative-free consensus-based particle method that finds the Nash equilibrium of non-convex multiplayer games, where it proves the global exponential convergence in the sense of mean-field law. This…
We consider the problem of approximating Nash equilibria of $N$ functions $f_1,\dots, f_N$ of $N$ variables. In particular, we deduce conditions under which systems of the form $$ \dot u_j(t)=-\nabla_{x_j}f_j(u(t)) $$ $(j=1,\dots, N)$ are…
Motivated by Generative Adversarial Networks, we study the computation of Nash equilibrium in concave network zero-sum games (NZSGs), a multiplayer generalization of two-player zero-sum games first proposed with linear payoffs. Extending…