Related papers: Inverse maximum theorems and some consequences
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with linear coupling constraints affected by both local (i.e., agent-wise) and global (i.e., shared resources) disturbances taking values in polyhedral uncertainty sets. By making…
We investigate a time-inconsistent, non-Markovian finite-player game in continuous time, where each player's objective functional depends non-linearly on the expected value of the state process. As a result, the classical Bellman optimality…
We discuss a natural game of competition and solve the corresponding mean field game with \emph{common noise} when agents' rewards are \emph{rank dependent}. We use this solution to provide an approximate Nash equilibrium for the finite…
Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central concept in game theory. Here we prove formally a published theorem on existence of an NE in two proof assistants, Coq and Isabelle: starting from a game with finitely many outcomes, one may derive a game…
Research in Economics and Game theory has necessitated results on Carath\'eodory-type selections. In particular, one has to obtain Carath\'eodory type-selections from correspondences that need not be continuous (neither lower-semicontinuous…
The theory of combinatorial game (like board games) and the theory of social games (where one looks for Nash equilibria) are normally considered as two separate theories. Here we shall see what comes out of combining the ideas. The central…
In this paper, we propose a passivity-based methodology for analysis and design of reinforcement learning in multi-agent finite games. Starting from a known exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning scheme, we show that convergence to…
A mean-field game (MFG) seeks the Nash Equilibrium of a game involving a continuum of players, where the Nash Equilibrium corresponds to a fixed point of the best-response mapping. However, simple fixed-point iterations do not always…
We show the convergence of finite state symmetric N-player differential games, where players control their transition rates from state to state, to a limiting dynamics given by a finite state Mean Field Game system made of two coupled…
This paper is devoted to Nash equilibrium for games in capacities. Such games with payoff expressed by Choquet integral were considered by Kozhan and Zarichnyi (Nash equilibria for games in capacities, Econ. Theory {\bf 35} (2008) 321--331)…
With respect to probabilistic mixtures of the strategies in non-cooperative games, quantum game theory provides guarantee of fixed-point stability, the so-called Nash equilibrium. This permits players to choose mixed quantum strategies that…
The paper is devoted to inverse Stackelberg games with many players. We consider both static and differential games. The main assumption of the paper is the compactness of the strategy sets. We obtain the characterization of inverse…
The paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. We investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity, and the limit of value functions of…
We prove the almost equivalence of the minimax theorem and the strong duality theorem for a large class of games and conic programs. The previous fundamental results on the equivalence of linear programming and two-player zero-sum games…
A Nash equilibrium has become important solution concept for analyzing the decision making in Game theory. In this paper, we consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria of a subclass of generic finite normal form games. We define…
We study infinite-horizon discounted two-player zero-sum Markov games, and develop a decentralized algorithm that provably converges to the set of Nash equilibria under self-play. Our algorithm is based on running an Optimistic Gradient…
In the present work we deal with set-valued equilibrium problems for which we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution. The conditions that we consider are imposed not on the whole domain, but rather on a self…
We show that the value function of an optimal stopping game driven by a one-dimensional diffusion can be characterised using a modification of the Legendre transformation if and only if the optimal stopping game exhibits a Nash equilibrium…
A new combinatorial game is given. It generalizes both Substraction and Nim. It is proved the computation of Nash equilibrium points in this new game is NP-hard.
Multi-agent games are becoming an increasing prevalent formalism for the study of electronic commerce and auctions. The speed at which transactions can take place and the growing complexity of electronic marketplaces makes the study of…