Related papers: Learning Equilibria in Mean-Field Games: Introduci…
Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…
Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single…
We present a new combined \textit{mean field control game} (MFCG) problem which can be interpreted as a competitive game between collaborating groups and its solution as a Nash equilibrium between groups. Players coordinate their strategies…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has become effective in tackling discrete cooperative game scenarios. However, MARL has yet to penetrate settings beyond those modelled by team and zero-sum games, confining it to a small subset of…
This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in Cournot games with continuous actions. Cournot games are the essential model for many socio-economic systems, where players compete by strategically setting their output quantity.…
In large systems, it is important for agents to learn to act effectively, but sophisticated multi-agent learning algorithms generally do not scale. An alternative approach is to find restricted classes of games where simple, efficient…
We introduce a mean field model for optimal holding of a representative agent of her peers as a natural expected scaling limit from the corresponding $N-$agent model. The induced mean field dynamics appear naturally in a form which is not…
In recent years, reinforcement learning and its multi-agent analogue have achieved great success in solving various complex control problems. However, multi-agent reinforcement learning remains challenging both in its theoretical analysis…
The literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding predominantly focuses on single games or their repeated play. Nevertheless, numerous real-world scenarios feature playing a game sampled from a distribution of similar, but not identical…
We consider learning Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum Markov Games with nonlinear function approximation, where the action-value function is approximated by a function in a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS). The key challenge is…
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
Learning in multi-player games can model a large variety of practical scenarios, where each player seeks to optimize its own local objective function, which at the same time relies on the actions taken by others. Motivated by the frequent…
We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…
Self-play alignment has emerged as an effective approach for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs), formulating preference optimization as a two-player game. However, the regularization with respect to the reference policy, which is…
Standard reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) approaches relying on parametric models like the Bradley-Terry model fall short in capturing the intransitivity and irrationality in human preferences. Recent advancements suggest…
We examine global non-asymptotic convergence properties of policy gradient methods for multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) problems in Markov potential games (MPG). To learn a Nash equilibrium of an MPG in which the size of state space…
This paper studies multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games, with the goal of learning Nash equilibria or coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) sample-optimally. All prior results suffer from at least one of the two obstacles: the…
In this paper, we address an instance of uniquely solvable mean-field game with a common noise whose corresponding counterpart without common noise has several equilibria. We study the selection problem for this mean-field game without…
Mean field type games (MFTGs) describe Nash equilibria between large coalitions: each coalition consists of a continuum of cooperative agents who maximize the average reward of their coalition while interacting non-cooperatively with a…
We introduce the topic of learning in multiagent systems. We first provide a quick introduction to the field of game theory, focusing on the equilibrium concepts of iterated dominance, and Nash equilibrium. We show some of the most relevant…