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Current fault-tolerant quantum compilers allocate error budgets uniformly during resource estimation, causing suboptimal physical resource overhead. We optimize this allocation using a potential game formulation, where Nash Equilibrium…
Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…
We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…
In this paper, we first devise two algorithms to determine whether or not a bimatrix game has a strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If so, we propose an algorithm that computes the strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If a given…
Several works have shown unconditional hardness (via integrality gaps) of computing equilibria using strong hierarchies of convex relaxations. Such results however only apply to the problem of computing equilibria that optimize a certain…
Game theory finds nowadays a broad range of applications in engineering and machine learning. However, in a derivative-free, expensive black-box context, very few algorithmic solutions are available to find game equilibria. Here, we propose…
Optimization of deep learning algorithms to approach Nash Equilibrium remains a significant problem in imperfect information games, e.g. StarCraft and poker. Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) has provided an effective way to learn…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has several weaknesses, since it may prescribe to play sub-optimal…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
AI in Math deals with mathematics in a constructive manner so that reasoning becomes automated, less laborious, and less error-prone. For algorithms, the question becomes how to automate analyses for specific problems. For the first time,…
This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al. \cite{kls} as a way to represent all…
Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form…
In this tutorial, we provide an introduction to machine learning methods for finding Nash equilibria in games with large number of agents. These types of problems are important for the operations research community because of their…
Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms,…
Many real-world domains contain multiple agents behaving strategically with probabilistic transitions and uncertain (potentially infinite) duration. Such settings can be modeled as stochastic games. While algorithms have been developed for…
We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…