Related papers: Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning for Correlated Equ…
Focusing on the expert problem in online learning, this paper studies the interpolation of several performance metrics via $\phi$-regret minimization, which measures the total loss of an algorithm by its regret with respect to an arbitrary…
In the classic expert problem, $\Phi$-regret measures the gap between the learner's total loss and that achieved by applying the best action transformation $\phi \in \Phi$. A recent work by Lu et al., [2025] introduces an adaptive algorithm…
No-regret learning dynamics ensure that a learner asymptotically achieves an average reward no worse than that of any fixed strategy. This no-regret guarantee does not determine the value of the asymptotic average reward. Indeed, it is…
This work tackles the complexities of multi-player scenarios in \emph{unknown games}, where the primary challenge lies in navigating the uncertainty of the environment through bandit feedback alongside strategic decision-making. We…
We study time-inhomogeneous episodic reinforcement learning (RL) under general function approximation and sparse rewards. We design a new algorithm, Variance-weighted Optimistic $Q$-Learning (VO$Q$L), based on $Q$-learning and bound its…
We investigate online convex optimization in non-stationary environments and choose dynamic regret as the performance measure, defined as the difference between cumulative loss incurred by the online algorithm and that of any feasible…
$\Phi$-equilibria -- and the associated notion of $\Phi$-regret -- are a powerful and flexible framework at the heart of online learning and game theory, whereby enriching the set of deviations $\Phi$ begets stronger notions of rationality.…
We study the question of obtaining last-iterate convergence rates for no-regret learning algorithms in multi-player games. We show that the optimistic gradient (OG) algorithm with a constant step-size, which is no-regret, achieves a…
We consider the problem of learning to play a repeated multi-agent game with an unknown reward function. Single player online learning algorithms attain strong regret bounds when provided with full information feedback, which unfortunately…
We propose the first model-free algorithm that achieves low regret performance for decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum tabular stochastic games with infinite-horizon average-reward objective. In decentralized learning, the…
Non-stationary online learning has drawn much attention in recent years. Despite considerable progress, dynamic regret minimization has primarily focused on convex functions, leaving the functions with stronger curvature (e.g., squared or…
We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to using a best-response oracle.…
We consider learning Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum Markov Games with nonlinear function approximation, where the action-value function is approximated by a function in a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS). The key challenge is…
Recent literature has made much progress in understanding \emph{online LQR}: a modern learning-theoretic take on the classical control problem in which a learner attempts to optimally control an unknown linear dynamical system with fully…
Universal online learning aims to achieve optimal regret guarantees without requiring prior knowledge of the curvature of online functions. Existing methods have established minimax-optimal regret bounds for universal online learning, where…
This paper studies the optimistic variant of Fictitious Play for learning in two-player zero-sum games. While it is known that Optimistic FTRL -- a regularized algorithm with a bounded stepsize parameter -- obtains constant regret in this…
We study two-player general sum repeated finite games where the rewards of each player are generated from an unknown distribution. Our aim is to find the egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) for the repeated game, which can lead to much…
In the experts problem, on each of $T$ days, an agent needs to follow the advice of one of $n$ ``experts''. After each day, the loss associated with each expert's advice is revealed. A fundamental result in learning theory says that the…
When deployed in the world, a learning agent such as a recommender system or a chatbot often repeatedly interacts with another learning agent (such as a user) over time. In many such two-agent systems, each agent learns separately and the…
Cheung and Piliouras (2020) recently showed that two variants of the Multiplicative Weights Update method - OMWU and MWU - display opposite convergence properties depending on whether the game is zero-sum or cooperative. Inspired by this…