Related papers: Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning for Correlated Equ…
We develop an operator algebraic framework for infinite games with a continuum of agents and prove that regret based learning dynamics governed by a noncommutative continuity equation converge to a unique quantal response equilibrium under…
We study safe reinforcement learning in finite-horizon linear mixture constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) with adversarial rewards under full-information feedback and an unknown transition kernel. We propose a primal-dual policy…
We initiate the study of dynamic regret minimization for goal-oriented reinforcement learning modeled by a non-stationary stochastic shortest path problem with changing cost and transition functions. We start by establishing a lower bound…
We study the online calibration of multi-dimensional forecasts over an arbitrary convex set $\mathcal{P} \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ relative to an arbitrary norm $\Vert\cdot\Vert$. We connect this with the problem of external regret minimization…
We study Bayesian learning in episodic, finite-horizon zero-sum Markov games with unknown transition and reward models. We investigate a posterior algorithm in which each player maintains a Bayesian posterior over the game model,…
The Competing Bandits framework is a recently emerging area that integrates multi-armed bandits in online learning with stable matching in game theory. While conventional models assume that all players and arms are constantly available, in…
Understanding and predicting the behavior of large-scale multi-agents in games remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent systems. This paper examines the role of heterogeneity in equilibrium formation by analyzing how smooth…
We investigate the interplay between passivity, no-regret, and convergence in contractive games for various learning dynamic models and their higher-order variants. Our setting is continuous time. Building on prior work for replicator…
A recent emerging trend in the literature on learning in games has been concerned with providing faster learning dynamics for correlated and coarse correlated equilibria in normal-form games. Much less is known about the significantly more…
Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games, such as poker. Yet, surprisingly little is known so far in…
Solving strategic games with huge action space is a critical yet under-explored topic in economics, operations research and artificial intelligence. This paper proposes new learning algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum normal-form…
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) -- where multiple agents learn to interact in a shared dynamic environment -- permeates across a wide range of critical applications. While there has been substantial progress on understanding the…
The convergence of online learning algorithms in games under self-play is a fundamental question in game theory and machine learning. Among various notions of convergence, last-iterate convergence is particularly desirable, as it reflects…
In this paper, we study the contextual multinomial logit (MNL) bandit problem in which a learning agent sequentially selects an assortment based on contextual information, and user feedback follows an MNL choice model. There has been a…
While extensive-form games (EFGs) can be converted into normal-form games (NFGs), doing so comes at the cost of an exponential blowup of the strategy space. So, progress on NFGs and EFGs has historically followed separate tracks, with the…
Policy optimization methods are popular reinforcement learning algorithms in practice. Recent works have built theoretical foundation for them by proving $\sqrt{T}$ regret bounds even when the losses are adversarial. Such bounds are tight…
A central issue lying at the heart of online reinforcement learning (RL) is data efficiency. While a number of recent works achieved asymptotically minimal regret in online RL, the optimality of these results is only guaranteed in a…
We consider the problem where $M$ agents interact with $M$ identical and independent environments with $S$ states and $A$ actions using reinforcement learning for $T$ rounds. The agents share their data with a central server to minimize…
Obtaining no-regret guarantees for reinforcement learning (RL) in the case of problems with continuous state and/or action spaces is still one of the major open challenges in the field. Recently, a variety of solutions have been proposed,…
Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under…