Related papers: Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are `goods' i.e., they yield positive utility for the agents. There is also some work where the items are `chores' that…
The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of…
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
We present a simple dynamical model for describing trading interactions between agents in a social network by considering only two dynamical variables, namely money and goods or services, that are assumed conserved over the whole time span…
We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for mixed goods) and truthful mechanism in general. This…
We consider a simple decision model in which a set of agents randomly choose one of two competing shops selling the same perishable products (typically food). The satisfaction of agents with respect to a given store is related to the…
We investigate a market without money in which agents can offer certain goods (or multiple copies of an agent-specific good) in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange must be balanced in the sense that each agent should receive a…
This paper introduces a novel reachability problem for the scenario involving two agents, where one agent follows another agent using a feedback strategy. The geometry of the reachable set for an agent, termed \emph{dependent reachable…
We study the fair division of indivisible items. In the general model, the goal is to allocate $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents while satisfying fairness criteria such as MMS, EF1, and EFX. We also study a recently-introduced graphical…
We consider the problem of determining whether a target item assignment can be reached from an initial item assignment by a sequence of pairwise exchanges of items between agents. In particular, we consider the situation where each agent…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to multiple agents. Recent work [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] focused on allocating goods in a sequential way, and studied what is the "best" sequence of agents to pick objects based…
The study of matching theory has gained importance recently with applications in Kidney Exchange, House Allocation, School Choice etc. The general theme of these problems is to allocate goods in a fair manner amongst participating agents.…
In this work, we study theoretical models of \emph{programmable matter} systems. The systems under consideration consist of spherical modules, kept together by magnetic forces and able to perform two minimal mechanical operations (or…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. Therefore, we study fair allocations of indivisible items…
We study a simple exchange market, introduced by Gourv\'{e}s, Lesca and Wilczynski (IJCAI-17), where every agent initially holds a single object. The agents have preferences over the objects, and two agents may swap their objects if they…
We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of incentive compatibility (strategy-proofness), Pareto…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…