Related papers: Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods
We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…
This paper studies the allocation of indivisible items to agents, when each agent's preferences are expressed by means of a directed acyclic graph. The vertices of each preference graph represent the subset of items approved of by the…
We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ messages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in a weighted…
This work's purpose is to understand the dynamics of limit order books in order-driven markets. We try to illustrate a dynamical trading mechanism attached to the microstructure of limit order markets. We capture the iterative nature of…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ goods among $n$ agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint distribution. Prior works have shown that if this distribution…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
We study multi-type housing markets, where there are $p\ge 2$ types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without monetary transfer to (re)allocate items to the agents based on…
In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents…
We propose a set of conservative models in which agents exchange wealth with a preference in the choice of interacting agents in different ways. The common feature in all the models is that the temporary values of financial status of agents…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…
We consider the task of allocating indivisible items to agents, when the agents' preferences over the items are identical. The preferences are captured by means of a directed acyclic graph, with vertices representing items and an edge…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items…
A set of economic entities embedded in a network graph collaborate by opportunistically exchanging their resources to satisfy their dynamically generated needs. Under what conditions their collaboration leads to a sustainable economy? Which…
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical,…
We study the computational complexity of fair division of indivisible items in an enriched model: there is an underlying graph on the set of items. And we have to allocate the items (i.e., the vertices of the graph) to a set of agents in…
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this…
A money transfer involves a buyer and a seller. A buyer buys goods or services from a seller. The money the buyer decreases is the same as that the seller increases. At each time step, a pair of socially connected agents are selected and…
Bilateral trade is one of the most natural and important forms of economic interaction: A seller has a single, indivisible item for sale, and a buyer is potentially interested. The two parties typically have different, privately known…
We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. Each category has a capacity constraint (the same for all…