Related papers: Stochastic Multiplicative Weights Updates in Zero-…

We study the distribution of strategies in a large game that models how agents choose among different double auction markets. We classify the possible mean field Nash equilibria, which include potentially segregated states where an agent…

Zero-sum games such as chess and poker are, abstractly, functions that evaluate pairs of agents, for example labeling them `winner' and `loser'. If the game is approximately transitive, then self-play generates sequences of agents of…

We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm for stationary mean-field games, where the goal is to learn a pair of mean-field state and stationary policy that constitutes the Nash equilibrium. When viewing the mean-field state and the…

We prove the existence and computability of optimal strategies in weighted limit games, zero-sum infinite-duration games with a B\"uchi-style winning condition requiring to produce infinitely many play prefixes that satisfy a given regular…

In this paper, we consider the $n \times n$ two-payer zero-sum repeated game in which one player (player X) employs the popular Hedge (also called multiplicative weights update) learning algorithm while the other player (player Y) adopts…

Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…

Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…

We consider in discrete time, a general class of sequential stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information with the following features. The underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents' joint actions. Each agent's…

This paper considers the problem of designing optimal algorithms for reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum games. We focus on self-play algorithms which learn the optimal policy by playing against itself without any direct…

We characterize offline data poisoning attacks on Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), where an attacker may change a data set in an attempt to install a (potentially fictitious) unique Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for a two-player…

In cellular networks, User Equipment (UE) handoff from one Base Station (BS) to another, giving rise to the load balancing problem among the BSs. To address this problem, BSs can work collaboratively to deliver a smooth migration (or…

Zero-sum games are a fundamental setting for adversarial training and decision-making in multi-agent learning (MAL). Existing methods often ensure convergence to (approximate) Nash equilibria by introducing a form of regularization. Yet,…

We propose a real-time nodal pricing mechanism for cost minimization and voltage control in a distribution network with autonomous distributed energy resources and analyze the resulting market using stochastic game theory. Unlike existing…

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon non-zero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions,…

We consider an example of stochastic games with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information. We obtain relevant equilibrium policies using a new approach which allows managing the belief updates in a structured manner. Agents have…

The ability of a deterministic, plastic system to learn to imitate stochastic behavior is analyzed. Two neural networks -actually, two perceptrons- are put to play a zero-sum game one against the other. The competition, by acting as a kind…

We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…

We explore the use of policy approximations to reduce the computational cost of learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games. We propose a new Q-learning type algorithm that uses a sequence of entropy-regularized soft policies to…

We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave…

This paper studies an $N$--agent cost-coupled game where the agents are connected via an unreliable capacity constrained network. Each agent receives state information over that network which loses packets with probability $p$. A Base…