Related papers: Controller-and-Stopper Stochastic Differential Gam…
Motivated by a product pricing problem, a linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game for a regime switching system involving one leader and two followers is studied. The two followers engage in a zero-sum differential game, and both the…
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…
We investigate a time-inconsistent, non-Markovian finite-player game in continuous time, where each player's objective functional depends non-linearly on the expected value of the state process. As a result, the classical Bellman optimality…
We consider the problem of optimal multiple switching in finite horizon, when the state of the system, including the switching costs, is a general adapted stochastic process. The problem is formulated as an extended impulse control problem…
Pursuit-evasion scenarios appear widely in robotics, security domains, and many other real-world situations. We focus on two-player pursuit-evasion games with concurrent moves, infinite horizon, and discounted rewards. We assume that the…
We study a specific class of finite-horizon mean field optimal stopping problems by means of the dynamic programming approach. In particular, we consider problems where the state process is not affected by the stopping time. Such problems…
In this paper, the known deterministic linear-quadratic Stackelberg game is revisited, whose open-loop Stackelberg solution actually possesses the nature of time inconsistency. To handle this time inconsistency, {a two-tier game framework…
We study a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls, on a finite time horizon. The objective of each player is to maximize her total expected discounted profits. The resolution methodology relies…
In this paper, we study a time-inconsistent stochastic optimal control problem with a recursive cost functional by a multi-person hierarchical differential game approach. An equilibrium strategy of this problem is constructed and a…
We study a class of stochastic target games where one player tries to find a strategy such that the state process almost-surely reaches a given target, no matter which action is chosen by the opponent. Our main result is a geometric dynamic…
Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…
We study a stochastic control problem on a bounded domain, which arises from a continuous-time optimal management model. Via the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation the value function is shown to be jointly continuous and to…
In this paper, we introduce a model-based deep-learning approach to solve finite-horizon continuous-time stochastic control problems with jumps. We iteratively train two neural networks: one to represent the optimal policy and the other to…
This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…
This paper is concerned with the stochastic recursive optimal control problem with mixed delay. The connection between Pontryagin's maximum principle and Bellman's dynamic programming principle is discussed. Without containing any…
We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to…
We study the computational complexity of basic decision problems for one-counter simple stochastic games (OC-SSGs), under various objectives. OC-SSGs are 2-player turn-based stochastic games played on the transition graph of classic…
We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated…
Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…
Our research is closely related to ontological studies in mathematics. It provides crucial insights into the nature of decisions and strategies characterized by Markov moments. In a stopping game, a holistic decision-maker would evaluate…