Related papers: Dynamic Games in Empirical Industrial Organization
We propose a game-theoretic framework for adaptive multi-agent intelligent systems. Unlike classical game theory, which often treats strategies as primitive objects chosen by perfectly rational agents, the proposed framework provides a…
Establishing the existence of exact or near Markov or stationary perfect Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum Markov games over Borel spaces is a challenging problem with limited positive results. Motivated by problems in multi-agent and Bayesian…
The vast majority of products we use daily are supplied to us through complex global supply chains that transform raw materials into finished goods and distribute them to end consumers. This paper proposes a modeling methodology for dynamic…
Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives choose control inputs to a dynamic system. Dynamic games model a wide variety of applications in economics, defense, and energy systems. However, compared to single-agent…
We use ideas from distributed computing and game theory to study dynamic and decentralized environments in which computational nodes, or decision makers, interact strategically and with limited information. In such environments, which arise…
Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…
Two fundamental problems in computational game theory are computing a Nash equilibrium and learning to exploit opponents given observations of their play (opponent exploitation). The latter is perhaps even more important than the former:…
We introduce a new unified framework for modelling both decision problems and finite games based on quantifiers and selection functions. We show that the canonical utility maximisation is one special case of a quantifier and that our more…
Game theory has emerged as a powerful framework for modeling a large range of multi-agent scenarios. Many algorithmic solutions require discrete, finite games with payoffs that have a closed-form specification. In contrast, many real-world…
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
Global games are a class of incomplete information games where the payoffs exhibit strategic complementarity leading to an incentive for the agents to coordinate their actions. Such games have been used to model scenarios in many…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
A general class of mean field games are considered where the governing dynamics are controlled diffusions in $\mathbb{R}^d$. The optimization criterion is the long time average of a running cost function. Under various sets of hypotheses,…
We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…
In this paper, we introduce a framework of new mathematical representation of Game Theory, including static classical game and static quantum game. The idea is to find a set of base vectors in every single-player strategy space and to…
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player…
We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player discrete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models individual players' myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The…
Noncooperative game-theoretic tools have been increasingly used to study many important resource allocation problems in communications, networking, smart grids, and portfolio optimization. In this paper, we consider a general class of…
The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…