Related papers: A Verification Theorem for Stackelberg Stochastic …

In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…

This paper studies discrete-time two-person nonzero-sum linear quadratic stochastic games with random coefficients. Using convex variational analysis, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of open-loop Nash…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…

An oblique projections based feedback stabilizability result in the literature is extended to a larger class of reaction-convection terms. A discussion is presented including a comparison between explicit oblique projections base feedback…

In this paper, a partially observed stochastic linear Stackelberg differential game with mean-variance criteria is studied. Randomness comes from Brownian motions and Poisson random measures. which leads to a circular dependency. We follow…

In this paper, we consider a linear quadratic stochastic two-person zero-sum differential game. The controls for both players are allowed to appear in both drift and diffusion of the state equation. The weighting matrices in the performance…

In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to solve online Stackelberg games, featuring multiple followers, in a follower-agnostic manner. Unlike previous works, our approach works even when leader has no knowledge about the…

The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a…

We present an analog of O'Neill's Theorem (Theorem 5.2 in [17]) for finite games, which reveals some of the structure of equilibria under payoff perturbations in finite games.

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

We establish the existence and uniqueness of distributed equilibria to possibly nonsymmetric $N$ player differential games with interactions through controls under displacement semimonotonicity assumptions. Surprisingly, the nonseparable…

This paper studies a class of partial information linear-quadratic mean-field game problems. A general stochastic large-population system is considered, where the diffusion term of the dynamic of each agent can depend on the state and…

One of the fundamental issues in Control Theory is to design feedback controls. It is well-known that, the purpose of introducing Riccati equations in the deterministic case is to provide the desired feedback controls for linear quadratic…

Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…

We study a class of linear-quadratic mean-field games with incomplete information. For each agent, the state is given by a linear forward stochastic differential equation with common noise. Moreover, both the state and control variables can…

For a non-cooperative m-persons differential game, the value functions ofthe various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations.Nashequilibrium solutions in feedback form can be obtained by studying a related system of…

We consider a finite-time stochastic drift control problem with the assumption that the control is bounded and the system is controlled until the state process leaves the half-line. Assuming general conditions, it is proved that the…

In this paper we study continuous-time two-player zero-sum optimal switching games on a finite horizon. Using the theory of doubly reflected BSDEs with interconnected barriers, we show that this game has a value and an equilibrium in the…

The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor work "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorithmic details on how to…

This paper investigates a Stackelberg game between an insurer and a reinsurer under the $\alpha$-maxmin mean-variance criterion. The insurer can purchase per-loss reinsurance from the reinsurer. With the insurer's feedback reinsurance…