Related papers: A Verification Theorem for Stackelberg Stochastic …
This paper is concerned with a stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem of Markovian regime switching system with model uncertainty and partial information, where the information available to the control is based on a…
We consider an N-player hierarchical game in which the i-th player's objective comprises of an expectation-valued term, parametrized by rival decisions, and a hierarchical term. Such a framework allows for capturing a broad range of…
We formulate and study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic dynamic games with partial and asymmetric information. Information asymmetry introduces fundamental challenges involving \emph{belief representation} and \emph{theory of mind}…
We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…
The stabilizability of a general class of abstract parabolic-like equations is investigated, with a finite number of actuators. This class includes the case of actuators given as delta distributions located at given points in the spatial…
We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in general-sum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In…
Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…
Schmidt's game is a powerful tool for studying properties of certain sets which arise in Diophantine approximation theory, number theory, and dynamics. Recently, many new results have been proven using this game. In this paper we address…
This paper considers linear-quadratic (LQ) stochastic leader-follower Stackelberg differential games for jump-diffusion systems with random coefficients. We first solve the LQ problem of the follower using the stochastic maximum principle…
In this paper, we study a linear-quadratic partially observed Stackelberg stochastic differential game problem in which a single leader and multiple followers are involved. We consider more practical formulation for partial information that…
This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…
It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
By utilizing tools from game theory, we develop a novel multi-period-multi-company demand response framework considering the interactions between companies (sellers of energy) and their consumers (buyers of energy). We model the…
Concurrent stochastic games are an important formalism for the rational verification of probabilistic multi-agent systems, which involves verifying whether a temporal logic property is satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria of…
In this paper, we study finite-agent linear-quadratic games on graphs. Specifically, we propose a comprehensive framework that extends the existing literature by incorporating heterogeneous and interpretable player interactions. Compared to…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
We consider the long-time behavior of equilibrium strategies and state trajectories in a linear quadratic $N$-player game with Gaussian initial data. By comparing the finite-horizon game with its ergodic counterpart, we establish…
This paper investigates two-player ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with McKean-Vlasov dynamics. We establish a verification theorem connecting solutions of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Master equations to Nash…