Related papers: Approximate Core Allocations for Multiple Partners…

In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…

The assignment game is a classical model for profit sharing and a cornerstone of cooperative game theory. While an imputation in its core guarantees fairness among coalitions, it provides no fairness guarantee at the level of individual…

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…

Emerging network paradigms and applications increasingly rely on federated learning (FL) to enable collaborative intelligence while preserving privacy. However, the sustainability of such collaborative environments hinges on a fair and…

Coreness represents solution concepts related to core in cooperative games, which captures the stability of players. Motivated by the scale effect in social networks, economics and other scenario, we study the coreness of cooperative game…

We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over…

This work shows that the formation of a finite number of coalitions in a nonatomic network congestion game benefits everyone. At the equilibrium of the composite game played by coalitions and individuals, the average cost to each coalition…

In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the…

Federated learning is a distributed machine learning system that uses participants' data to train an improved global model. In federated learning, participants cooperatively train a global model, and they will receive the global model and…

In many situations when people are assigned to coalitions, the utility of each person depends on the friends in her coalition. Additionally, in many situations, the size of each coalition should be bounded. This paper studies such coalition…

We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…

We analyze the core of a cooperative Cournot game. We assume that when contemplating a deviation, the members of a coalition assign positive probability over all possible coalition structures that the non-members can form. We show that when…

This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…

We propose a class of cooperative games, called d Partitioned Compbinatorial Optimization Games (PCOGs). The input of PCOG consists of a set of agents and a combinatorial structure (typically a graph) with a fixed optimization goal on this…

In this paper, we deal with the problem of maximizing the profit of Network Operators (NOs) of green cellular networks in situations where Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees must be ensured to users, and Base Stations (BSs) can be shared…

We give new characterizations of core imputations for the following games: * The assignment game. * Concurrent games, i.e., general graph matching games having non-empty core. * The unconstrained bipartite $b$-matching game (edges can be…

The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings,…

We study fair allocation of profit (or cost) for three central problems from combinatorial optimization: Max-Flow, MST and $b$-matching. The essentially unequivocal choice of solution concept for this purpose would be the core, because of…

The present study explores a problem that can be resolved by employing the notion of a partially defined cooperative game, yet cannot by using a restricted game. The following situation is considered: First, it is assumed that the worth of…

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…