Related papers: Incentive-Compatible Kidney Exchange in a Slightly…
We initiate the study of approximate maximum matching in the vertex partition model, for graphs subject to dynamic changes. We assume that the $n$ vertices of the graph are partitioned among $k$ players, who execute a distributed algorithm…
Constrained maximization of submodular functions poses a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, a number of agents need to maximize multiple submodular objectives over the same ground set. We study such…
This paper investigates the effect of network topology on the fair allocation of network resources among a set of agents, an all-important issue for the efficiency of transportation networks all around us. We analyse a generic mechanism…
The window mechanism was introduced by Chatterjee et al. to reinforce mean-payoff and total-payoff objectives with time bounds in two-player turn-based games on graphs. It has since proved useful in a variety of settings, including parity…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…
We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…
An important class of game-theoretic incentive mechanisms for eliciting effort from a crowd are the peer based mechanisms, in which workers are paid by matching their answers with one another. The other classic mechanism is to have the…
Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…
We consider variable selection in competing risks regression for multi-center data. Our research is motivated by deceased donor kidney transplants, from which recipients would experience graft failure, death with functioning graft (DWFG),…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…
Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
Path-aware networking architectures like SCION provide end-hosts with explicit control over inter-domain routing, while multipath transport protocols like MPTCP and MPQUIC enable the concurrent use of multiple paths. This combination…
Direct reciprocity is a wide-spread mechanism for evolution of cooperation. In repeated interactions, players can condition their behavior on previous outcomes. A well known approach is given by reactive strategies, which respond to the…
We consider the task of allocating indivisible items to agents, when the agents' preferences over the items are identical. The preferences are captured by means of a directed acyclic graph, with vertices representing items and an edge…
Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously…
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…
Heart transplantation is a viable path for patients suffering from advanced heart failure, but this lifesaving option is severely limited due to donor shortage. Although the current allocation policy was recently revised in 2018, a major…
We revisit a classic coordination problem from the perspective of mechanism design: how can we coordinate a social welfare maximizing flow in a network congestion game with selfish players? The classical approach, which computes tolls as a…