Related papers: Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A…
We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation techniques. More specifically, we consider the…
The goal of machine learning is to provide solutions which are trained by data or by experience coming from the environment. Many training algorithms exist and some brilliant successes were achieved. But even in structured environments for…
Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies a set of desired properties in an equilibrium of the game. Desirable properties for a…
We study heterogeneous $k$-facility location games. In this model there are $k$ facilities where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary arbitrarily. Our goal is to design…
Various models have been recently proposed to reflect and predict different properties of complex networks. However, the community structure, which is one of the most important properties, is not well studied and modeled. In this paper, we…
Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of…
We study deterministic mechanisms for the two-facility location problem. Given the reported locations of n agents on the real line, such a mechanism specifies where to build the two facilities. The single-facility variant of this problem…
We consider the problem of locating a public facility on a line, where a set of $n$ strategic agents report their \emph{locations} and a mechanism determines, either deterministically or randomly, the location of the facility. Game…
In this paper, we study a facility location problem within a competitive market context, where customer demand is predicted by a random utility choice model. Unlike prior research, which primarily focuses on simple constraints such as a…
Man-made and natural disruptions such as planned constructions on roads, suspensions of bridges, and blocked roads by trees/mudslides/floods can often create obstacles that separate two connected regions. As a result, the traveling and…
We consider a truthful facility location problem in which there is a set of agents with private locations on the line of real numbers, and the goal is to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those…
Facility location decisions significantly impact customer behavior and consequently the resulting demand in a wide range of businesses. Furthermore, sequentially realized uncertain demand enforces strategically determining locations under…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application…
In the past decade, a lot of progress has been made in the design and evaluation of logic locking; a premier technique to safeguard the integrity of integrated circuits throughout the electronics supply chain. However, the widespread…
In traditional facility location problems, a set of points is provided, and the objective is to determine the best location for a new facility based on criteria such as minimizing cost, time, and distances between clients and facilities.…
We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
Machine learning has enabled significant benefits in diverse fields, but, with a few exceptions, has had limited impact on computer architecture. Recent work, however, has explored broader applicability for design, optimization, and…
In the one-dimensional facility assignment problem, m facilities and n agents are positioned along the real line. Each agent will be assigned to a single facility to receive service. Each facility incurs a building cost, which is shared…