Related papers: In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approxi…

How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing.…

In multiplayer games, self-interested behavior among the players can harm the social welfare. Tax mechanisms are a common method to alleviate this issue and induce socially optimal behavior. In this work, we take the initial step of…

We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which…

Congestion games constitute an important class of games to model resource allocation by different users. As computing an exact or even an approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general PLS-complete, Caragiannis et al. (2011) present a…

In this work we study the power and limitations of fair interventions in weighted congestion games. Specifically, we focus on interventions that aim at improving the equilibrium quality (price of anarchy) and are fair in a suitably defined…

We study {\em bottleneck congestion games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck…

Atomic congestion games are a classic topic in network design, routing, and algorithmic game theory, and are capable of modeling congestion and flow optimization tasks in various application areas. While both the price of anarchy for such…

This study investigates an adaptive pricing scheme aimed at achieving an efficient state in a traffic congestion game characterized by a diverse population of road users. While the planner possesses knowledge of players' preferences, their…

Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes…

This paper studies the effects of introducing altruistic agents into atomic congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a trade-off between selfish and social objectives. In particular, we assume agents optimize a linear combination…

This paper is about minimum cost constrained selection of inputs and outputs for generic arbitrary pole placement. The input-output set is constrained in the sense that the set of states that each input can influence and the set of states…

Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the…

We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…

Many combinatorial optimization problems can be formulated as the search for a subgraph that satisfies certain properties and minimizes the total weight. We assume here that the vertices correspond to points in a metric space and can take…

We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum…

This work focuses on the design of taxes in atomic congestion games, a commonly studied model for competitive resource sharing. While most related studies focus on optimizing either the worst- or best-case performance (i.e., Price of…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…

We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue raised from tolls set on the arcs of a transportation network, under the constraint that users are assigned to toll-compatible shortest paths. We first prove that this problem is strongly…

We present a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing $d^{d+o(d)}$-approximate (pure) Nash equilibria in (proportional sharing) weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions of degree at most $d$. This is an…

Price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of social welfare in games due to the lack of a centralized authority that can enforce the optimal outcome. At its antipodes, mechanism design studies how to ameliorate these effects by…