Related papers: Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resou…
In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his…
Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality,…
We study the classic mechanism design problem of locating a public facility on a real line. In contrast to previous work, we assume that the agents are unable to fully specify where their preferred location lies, and instead only provide…
We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the social cost, where voters and candidates are associated with points in some underlying metric space. The social cost of a candidate is the sum of its distances to each…
We study deterministic mechanisms for the two-facility location problem. Given the reported locations of n agents on the real line, such a mechanism specifies where to build the two facilities. The single-facility variant of this problem…
In the one-dimensional facility assignment problem, m facilities and n agents are positioned along the real line. Each agent will be assigned to a single facility to receive service. Each facility incurs a building cost, which is shared…
In this paper, we study mechanism design for single-facility location games where each agent has multiple private locations in [0, 1]. The individual objective is a satisfaction function that measures the discrepancy between the optimal…
This paper considers the scenario in which there are multiple institutions, each with a limited capacity for candidates, and candidates, each with preferences over the institutions. A central entity evaluates the utility of each candidate…
In the facility location problem, the task is to place one or more facilities so as to minimize the sum of the agent costs for accessing their nearest facility. Heretofore, in the strategic version, agent locations have been assumed to be…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
Allocation of scarce healthcare resources under limited logistic and infrastructural facilities is a major issue in the modern society. We consider the problem of allocation of healthcare resources like vaccines to people or hospital beds…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
We consider competitive facility location as a two-stage multi-agent system with two types of clients. For a given host graph with weighted clients on the vertices, first facility agents strategically select vertices for opening their…
In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…
We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…
We consider the problem of allocating multiple heterogeneous resources geographically and over time to meet demands that require some subset of the available resource types simultaneously at a specified time, location, and duration. The…
Many scenarios where agents with restrictions compete for resources can be cast as maximum matching problems on bipartite graphs. Our focus is on resource allocation problems where agents may have restrictions that make them incompatible…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…