Related papers: Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resou…
We study facility location problems where agents control multiple locations and when reporting their locations can choose to hide some locations (hiding), report some locations more than once (replication) and lie about their locations…
We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and…
We study the problem of locating a single obnoxious facility on the normalized line segment $[0,1]$ with strategic agents from a mechanism design perspective. Each agent has a preference for the undesirable location of the facility and…
We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results…
The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the context of machine learning augmented algorithms, where the…
We consider a single-facility location problem, where agents are positioned on the real line and are partitioned into multiple disjoint districts. The goal is to choose a location (where a public facility is to be built) so as to minimize…
We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure…
We take the classic facility location problem and consider a variation, in which each agent's individual cost function is equal to their distance from the facility multiplied by a scaling factor which is determined by the facility…
We study mechanisms for the facility location problem augmented with predictions of the optimal facility location. We demonstrate that an egalitarian viewpoint which considers both the maximum distance of any agent from the facility and the…
We consider a truthful facility location problem in which there is a set of agents with private locations on the line of real numbers, and the goal is to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those…
Inspired by the recent COVID-19 pandemic, we study a generalization of the multi-resource allocation problem with heterogeneous demands and Leontief utilities. Unlike existing settings, we allow each agent to specify requirements to only…
We study the facility location games with candidate locations from a mechanism design perspective. Suppose there are n agents located in a metric space whose locations are their private information, and a group of candidate locations for…
In this work we consider general facility location and social choice problems, in which sets of agents $\mathcal{A}$ and facilities $\mathcal{F}$ are located in a metric space, and our goal is to assign agents to facilities (as well as…
This paper investigates mechanism design for congested facility location problems, where agents are partitioned into groups with conflicting interests (e.g., competition for booking a basketball court in a gymnasium), and each agent's cost…
In this paper, we study a truthful two-obnoxious-facility location problem, in which each agent has a private location in [0, 1] and a public optional preference over two obnoxious facilities, and there is a minimum distance constraint d…
In several socioeconomic-critical decision-making settings, such as fair resource allocation, climate policy, or AI alignment, multiple principals interact within a common arena. While it is well established that these principals may have…
The Facility Location Problem (FLP) is a well-studied optimization problem with applications in many real-world scenarios. Past literature has explored the solutions from different perspectives to tackle FLPs. These include investigating…
The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in…
In this paper, we investigate the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on a line. We focus on two frameworks. In the first framework, the number of facilities is arbitrary, all facilities have…
This paper studies algorithmic decision-making in the presence of strategic individual behaviors, where an ML model is used to make decisions about human agents and the latter can adapt their behavior strategically to improve their future…