Related papers: Positional Injectivity for Innocent Strategies

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

We study the computational complexity of solving stochastic games with mean-payoff objectives. Instead of identifying special classes in which simple strategies are sufficient to play $\epsilon$-optimally, or form $\epsilon$-Nash…

Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald's pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of…

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…

Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…

We propose a new model of provenance, based on a game-theoretic approach to query evaluation. First, we study games G in their own right, and ask how to explain that a position x in G is won, lost, or drawn. The resulting notion of game…

The paper studies properties of functional dependencies between strategies of players in Nash equilibria of multi-player strategic games. The main focus is on the properties of functional dependencies in the context of a fixed dependency…

We establish a generic result concerning order independence of a dominance relation on finite games. It allows us to draw conclusions about order independence of various dominance relations in a direct and simple way.

Zero-determinant strategies are memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relations between expected payoffs of players. Recently, the concept of zero-determinant strategies was extended to the class of…

In many multi-player interactions, players incur strictly positive costs each time they execute actions e.g. 'menu costs' or transaction costs in financial systems. Since acting at each available opportunity would accumulate prohibitively…

We demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature of network games, bilateral strategic interactions, is equivalent to having player utilities that are additively separable across opponents. We distinguish two formal notions of bilateral strategic…

Estimating discrete games of complete information is often computationally difficult due to partial identification and the absence of closed-form moment characterizations. This paper proposes computationally tractable approaches to…

Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…

We study partially observable assistance games (POAGs), a model of the human-AI value alignment problem which allows the human and the AI assistant to have partial observations. Motivated by concerns of AI deception, we study a…

In the game-theoretic model war of attrition, players are subject to an explicit cost proportional to the duration of contests. We construct a model where the time cost is not explicitly given, but instead depends implicitly on the…

In previous work on higher-order games, we accounted for finite games of unbounded length by working with continuous outcome functions, which carry implicit game trees. In this work we make such trees explicit. We use concepts from…

We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…

We study self-triggered two-player stochastic games on Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes (PDMPs) where each agent decides when to observe and which open-loop action to hold. Augmenting the state with clocks and committed controls…

We study dynamic finite-player and mean-field stochastic games within the framework of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). Our focus is on discrete time and space structures without monotonicity. Unlike their continuous-time analogues,…