Related papers: Positional Injectivity for Innocent Strategies
We define a game on 1-safe Petri nets, where a user plays against an environment in order to reach a goal on the system. The goal is expressed through an LTL-X formula, and represents a behaviour of the system that the user needs to…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…
Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the…
Parity games are positionally determined. This is a fundamental and classical result. In 2010, Calude et al. showed a breakthrough result for finite parity games: the winning regions and their positional winning strategies can be computed…
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…
Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…
In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…
We present a network influence game that models players strategically seeding the opinions of nodes embedded in a social network. A social learning dynamic, whereby nodes repeatedly update their opinions to resemble those of their…
We consider discrete-time Markov decision processes in which the decision maker is interested in long but finite horizons. First we consider reachability objective: the decision maker's goal is to reach a specific target state with the…
We study a wireless jamming problem consisting of the competition between a legitimate receiver and a jammer, as a zero-sum game where the value to maximize/minimize is the channel capacity at the receiver's side. Most of the approaches…
Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a…
In a single-state repeated game, zero-determinant strategies can unilaterally force functions of the payoffs to take values in particular closed intervals. When the explicit use of a determinant is absent from the analysis, they are instead…
We provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. For any finite game, we study how players coordinate their play on a signal by means of a public strategy whose instructions are expressed in some natural language. Language can…
We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…
As shown by Tsukada and Ong, simply-typed, normal and eta-long resource terms correspond to plays in Hyland-Ong games, quotiented by Melli\`es' homotopy equivalence. The original proof of this inspiring result is indirect, relying on the…
We present a method to automatically find security strategies for the use case of intrusion prevention. Following this method, we model the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a Markov game and let attack and defense…
We offer some theorems, mainly of finiteness, for certain patterns in elliptical billiards, related to periodic trajectories. For instance, if two players hit a ball at a given position and with directions forming a fixed angle in…