Related papers: Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportuniti…
The evolution of fairness in dyadic relationships has been studied using ultimatum games. However, human fairness is not limited to two-person situations and universal egalitarianism among group members is widely observed. In this study, we…
We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium outcomes are characterized by Cheapest Signal Equilibria,…
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…
We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
In this paper, we consider the social optimal problem of discrete time finite state space mean field games (referred to as finite mean field games [1]). Unlike the individual optimization of their own cost function in competitive models, in…
A real-valued game has the finite improvement property (FIP), if starting from an arbitrary strategy profile and letting the players change strategies to increase their individual payoffs in a sequential but non-deterministic order always…
We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it…
We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
Reputation plays a crucial role in social interactions by affecting the fitness of individuals during an evolutionary process. Previous works have extensively studied the result of imitation dynamics without focusing on potential irrational…
We study the range of prices at which a rational agent should contemplate transacting a financial contract outside a given securities market. Trading is subject to nonproportional transaction costs and portfolio constraints and full…
In practice there are temporary arbitrage opportunities arising from the fact that prices for a given asset at different stock exchanges are not instantaneously the same. We will show that even in such an environment there exists a…
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…
Allocation games are zero-sum games that model the distribution of resources among multiple agents. In this paper, we explore the interplay between an \textit{subjective identity} and its impact on notions of fairness in allocation. The…
We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a…
In resource contribution games, a class of non-cooperative games, the players want to obtain a bundle of resources and are endowed with bags of bundles of resources that they can make available into a common for all to enjoy. Available…
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from having a trusted mediator compared with the standard…
We study two-player general sum repeated finite games where the rewards of each player are generated from an unknown distribution. Our aim is to find the egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) for the repeated game, which can lead to much…