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In an incomplete semimartingale model of a financial market, we consider several risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of a bundle of contingent claims. Assuming that the agents' risk preferences are modelled by convex…
We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…
We propose a modification in the Sznajd sociophysics model defined on the square lattice. For this purpose, we consider reputation-a mechanism limiting the agents' persuasive power. The reputation is introduced as a time-dependent score,…
Costly pre-play messages can deter unnecessary wars - but the same messages can also entrench stalemates once violence begins. We develop an overlapping-generations model of a security dilemma with persistent group types (normal vs bad),…
Recent literature on computational notions of fairness has been broadly divided into two distinct camps, supporting interventions that address either individual-based or group-based fairness. Rather than privilege a single definition, we…
Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly meet. The conditions under which cooperation based on indirect reciprocity occurs have been examined in…
Repeated game theory has been one of the most prevailing tools for understanding the long-run relationships, which are footstones in building human society. Recent works have revealed a new set of "zero-determinant (ZD)" strategies, which…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
The question of "Justice" still divides social research and moral philosophy. Several Theories of Justice and conceptual approaches compete here, and distributive justice remains a major societal controversy. From an evolutionary point of…
Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…
Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the…
Humanity has been fascinated by the pursuit of fortune since time immemorial, and many successful outcomes benefit from strokes of luck. But success is subject to complexity, uncertainty, and change - and at times becoming increasingly…
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an…
I develop a continuous-time model in which an incumbent batch-service provider faces stochastic passenger arrivals and must decide when to dispatch under the threat of customer defection to a faster entrant. The incumbent's problem is…
We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly…
We study dynamic reputation in a social-learning environment where only purchase decisions are observable. A long-lived seller posts a fixed price and chooses costly product quality in each period before interacting with short-lived buyers…
We study an overlapping-generations model of community enforcement where each agent interacts once as young and once as old across two groups. After each match a minimal, directed record assigns a public "stigma" only when a player defects…
We study a game between $N$ job applicants who incur a cost $c$ (relative to the job value) to reveal their type during interviews and an administrator who seeks to maximize the probability of hiring the best. We define a full learning…
An arbitrage strategy allows a financial agent to make certain profit out of nothing, i.e., out of zero initial investment. This has to be disallowed on economic basis if the market is in equilibrium state, as opportunities for riskless…
We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory length, and as a result, different memory lengths…