Related papers: Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportuniti…
Over the years, numerous experiments have been accumulated to show that cooperation is not casual and depends on the payoffs of the game. These findings suggest that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and the same person may act…
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced by J. Desel and J. Esparza. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of…
Behavioral experiments on the Ultimatum Game have shown that we human beings have remarkable preference in fair play, contradicting the predictions by the game theory. Most of the existing models seeking for explanations, however, strictly…
In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed as autonomous agents on behalf of institutions and individuals in economic, political, and social settings that involve negotiation. Yet this trend carries significant risks if…
A fundamental decision faced by a firm hiring employees - and a familiar one to anyone who has dealt with the academic job market, for example - is deciding what caliber of candidates to pursue. Should the firm try to increase its…
The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
Decent social fairness is highly desired both for socio-economic activities and individuals, as it is one of the cornerstones of our social welfare and sustainability. How to effectively promote the level of fairness thus becomes a…
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public…
We study the behavior of for-profit institutions that broadcast reputations to foster trust among market participants. We develop a theoretical model in which buyers and sellers are matched on a platform to engage in transactions involving…
In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by…
For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are…
Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study…
We consider bargaining problems which involve two participants, with a nonempty closed, bounded convex bargaining set of points in the real plane representing all realizable bargains. We also assume that there is no definite threat or…
Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…
We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…
We consider games that have (k,t)-robust equilibria when played with a mediator, where an equilibrium is (k,t)-robust if it tolerates deviations by coalitions of size up to k and deviations by up to $t$ players with unknown utilities. We…
Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment…