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The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than two players. Here, we study…
Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections…
Cooperation plays a fundamental role in societal and biological domains, and the population structure profoundly shapes the dynamics of evolution. Practically, individuals behave either altruistically or egoistically in multiple groups,…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
We revisit in this paper the relation between evolution of species and the mathematical tool of evolutionary games, which has been used to model and predict it. We indicate known shortcoming of this model that restricts the capacity of…
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has…
We propose a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games that high- lights the role of network formation and effect of network structure. In line with empirical data, the model proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence…
A common assumption employed in most previous works on evolutionary game dynamics is that every individual player has full knowledge about and full access to the complete set of available strategies. In realistic social, economical, and…
Elucidating the mechanisms that lead to cooperation is still one of the main scientific challenges of current times, as many common cooperative scenarios remain elusive and at odds with Darwin's natural selection theory. Here, we study…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
We show that the resolution of social dilemmas on random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better performing players but rather their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy as the two emotions…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
A periodic behavior is a well observed phenomena in biological and economical systems. We show that evolutionary games on graphs with imitation dynamics can display periodic behavior for an arbitrary choice of game theoretical parameters…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…
We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…
We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria,…
Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model in a dynamical directed network. We analytically obtain the degree distribution…