Related papers: Evolutionary game model of group choice dilemmas o…

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…

Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity…

We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…

In this paper we study collective decision making on a multi-population, represented by a regular network of groups of individuals. Each group consists of a collection of players and every player can choose between two options. A group is…

Given a large population of players, each player has three possible choices between option 1 or 2 or no option. The two options are equally favorable and the population has to reach consensus on one of the two options quickly and in a…

Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are…

Dynamic nonzero sum games are widely used to model multi agent decision making in control, economics, and related fields. Classical methods for computing Nash equilibria, especially in linear quadratic settings, rely on strong structural…

We present and analyze a model for the evolution of the wealth distribution within a heterogeneous economic environment. The model considers a system of rational agents interacting in a game theoretical framework, through fairly general…

In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…

How cooperation emerges in human societies is still a puzzle. Evolutionary game theory has been the standard framework to address this issue. In most models, every individual plays with all others, and then reproduce and die according to…

We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what happens…

When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…

Evolutionary game theory has provided substantial contributions to explain the emergence of cooperation under unfavourable conditions in ecology, economics, and the social sciences. Recently, inspired by newly available empirical evidence…

We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperation--Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship network obtained from a social networking site. We demonstrate that such social network has small-world…

Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…

We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…

We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by…

We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…

Evolutionary games on graphs describe how strategic interactions and population structure determine evolutionary success, quantified by the probability that a single mutant takes over a population. Graph structures, compared to the…

Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of interaction…