Related papers: Lower Bounds Implementing Mediators in Asynchronou…

We consider games that have (k,t)-robust equilibria when played with a mediator, where an equilibrium is (k,t)-robust if it tolerates deviations by coalitions of size up to k and deviations by up to $t$ players with unknown utilities. We…

We consider $k$-resilient sequential equilibria, strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most $k$ players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, regardless of its local state. We prove that all $k$-resilient…

A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play…

We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…

A correlated equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in game theory that enjoys many desirable properties. However, it requires a trusted mediator, which is a major drawback in many practical applications. A computational solution to…

Secure function computation has been thoroughly studied and optimized in the past decades. We extend techniques used for secure computation to simulate arbitrary protocols involving a mediator. The key feature of our notion of simulation is…

We develop a new lower bound for k-set agreement in synchronous message-passing systems connected by an arbitrary directed communication network, where up to t processes may crash. Our result thus generalizes the t/k+1 lower bound for…

The celebrated result of Fischer, Lynch and Paterson is the fundamental lower bound for asynchronous fault tolerant computation: any 1-crash resilient asynchronous agreement protocol must have some (possibly measure zero) probability of not…

Blockchain systems need to solve consensus despite the presence of rational users and failures. The notion of $(k,t)$-robustness has shown instrumental to list problems that cannot be solved if $k$ players are rational and $t$ players are…

This paper investigates the implementation and performance of a decentralized information transmission mechanism in game with complete or incomplete games. We propose a mechanism that realizes irrational correlated equilibria or irrational…

In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…

This paper synthesizes anytime algorithms, in the form of continuous-time dynamical systems, to solve monotone variational inequalities. We introduce three algorithms that solve this problem: the projected monotone flow, the safe monotone…

In this paper we study the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria in load balancing games introduced by Asadpour and Saberi [3]. We prove tighter lower and upper bounds of 7/6 and 4/3, respectively. This improves over the best known bounds…

We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with non-negative symmetric payoffs. In this paper, we study…

We consider the problem of rational secret sharing introduced by Halpern and Teague [1], where the players involved in secret sharing play only if it is to their advantage. This can be characterized in the form of preferences. Players would…

Solving feedback Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamics and coupled constraints, a common scenario in practice, presents significant challenges. This work introduces an efficient method for computing approximate local feedback…

In this article, we investigate the solvability of $k$-set agreement among $n$ processes in distributed systems prone to different types of process failures. Specifically, we explore two scenarios: synchronous message-passing systems prone…

In this paper we prove lower bounds on randomized multiparty communication complexity, both in the \emph{blackboard model} (where each message is written on a blackboard for all players to see) and (mainly) in the \emph{message-passing…

It is well known that a non-cooperative game may have multiple equilibria. In this paper we consider the efficiency of games, measured by the ratio between the aggregate payoff over all Nash equilibria and that over all admissible controls.…

We study the performance of asymptotic and approximate consensus algorithms under harsh environmental conditions. The asymptotic consensus problem requires a set of agents to repeatedly set their outputs such that the outputs converge to a…