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Determining the space complexity of $x$-obstruction-free $k$-set agreement for $x\leq k$ is an open problem. In $x$-obstruction-free protocols, processes are required to return in executions where at most $x$ processes take steps. The best…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…
Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…
There is currently an intersection in the research of game theory and cryptography. Generally speaking, there are two aspects to this partnership. First there is the application of game theory to cryptography. Yet, the purpose of this paper…
Recent experimental evidence [Gruji\'c et al., PLoS ONE 5, e13749 (2010)] on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that players choosing to cooperate or not on the basis of their previous action and the actions of their neighbors coexist…
One of the main criticisms to game theory concerns the assumption of full rationality. Logit dynamics is a decentralized algorithm in which a level of irrationality (a.k.a. "noise") is introduced in players' behavior. In this context, the…
We study N-player finite games with costs perturbed due to time-varying disturbances in the underlying system and to that end, we propose the concept of Robust Correlated Equilibrium that generalizes the definition of Correlated…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…
It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive…
Here we prove an asymptotically optimal lower bound on the information complexity of the k-party disjointness function with the unique intersection promise, an important special case of the well known disjointness problem, and the…
Many algorithms have been proposed in prior literature to guarantee resilient multi-agent consensus in the presence of adversarial attacks or faults. The majority of prior work present excellent results that focus on discrete-time or…
We consider infinite duration alternating move games. These games were previously studied by Roth, Balcan, Kalai and Mansour. They presented an FPTAS for computing an approximated equilibrium, and conjectured that there is a polynomial…
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
Multi-defender Stackelberg Security Games (MSSG) have recently gained increasing attention in the literature. However, the solutions offered to date are highly sensitive, wherein even small perturbations in the attacker's utility or slight…
Given a system with $n > 3t + 1$ processes, where $t$ is the tolerated number of faulty ones, we present a fast asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol that can reach agreement in $O(t)$ expected running time. This improves the $O(n^2)$…