Related papers: Optimal Fees for Geometric Mean Market Makers
To trade tokens in cryptoeconomic systems, automated market makers (AMMs) typically rely on liquidity providers (LPs) that deposit tokens in exchange for rewards. To profit from such rewards, LPs must use effective liquidity provisioning…
The programmable and composable nature of smart contract protocols has enabled the emergence of novel market structures and asset classes that are architecturally frictional to implement in traditional financial paradigms. This fluidity has…
Geometric Mean Market Makers (G3M) such as Uniswap, Sushiswap or Balancer are key building blocks of the nascent Decentralised Finance system. We establish non-arbitrage bounds for the wealth process of such Automated Market Makers in the…
We introduce a new class of automated market maker (AMM), the \emph{partially active automated market maker} (PA-AMM). PA-AMM divides its reserves into two parts, the active and the passive parts, and uses only the active part for trading.…
Liquidity and trading activity on constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap, Curve, and Balancer has grown significantly in the second half of 2020. Much of the growth of these protocols has been driven by incentivized pools…
We consider a trading marketplace that is populated by traders with diverse trading strategies and objectives. The marketplace allows the suppliers to list their goods and facilitates matching between buyers and sellers. In return, such a…
Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…
Automated market makers (AMMs) are smart contracts that automatically trade electronic assets according to a mathematical formula. This paper investigates how an AMM's formula affects the interests of liquidity providers, who endow the AMM…
Automated market makers (AMMs) allocate fee revenue \textit{proportional} to the amount of liquidity investors deposit. In this paper, we study the economic consequences of the competition between passive liquidity providers (LPs) caused by…
An automated market maker (AMM) is a state machine that manages pools of assets, allowing parties to buy and sell those assets according to a fixed mathematical formula. AMMs are typically implemented as smart contracts on blockchains, and…
Automated market makers (AMMs) quote prices from pool state rather than from a limit order book. AMM pools often stay close to a reference price because arbitrageurs correct profitable mispricing. A large part of decentralized finance…
Constant Product Market Makers use fees that are typically fixed proportions of trade size. When these fees are automatically reinvested into the pool, as in Uniswap~V2 and some designs of Uniswap V4, the final state after a trade can…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are major centers of matching liquidity supply and demand in Decentralized Finance. Their functioning relies primarily on the presence of liquidity providers (LPs) incentivized to invest their assets into a…
Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users' transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners' participation and may jeopardize…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a class of smart contracts on Ethereum and other blockchains that "make markets" autonomously. In other words, AMMs stand ready to trade with other market participants that interact with them, at the…
We provide a framework for analyzing impermanent loss for general Automated Market Makers (AMMs) and show that Geometric Mean Market Makers (G3Ms) are in a rigorous sense the simplest class of AMMs from an impermanent loss viewpoint. In…
Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block…
This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among…
Triangle fees are a novel fee structure for AMMs, in which marginal fees are decreasing in a trade's size. That decline is proportional to the movement in the AMM's implied price, i.e. for every basis point the trade moves the ratio of…
We study the optimal routing problem in decentralized exchanges built on Constant Function Market Makers when trades can be split across multiple heterogeneous pools and execution incurs fixed on-chain costs (gas fees). While prior routing…