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Two fundamental problems in computational game theory are computing a Nash equilibrium and learning to exploit opponents given observations of their play (opponent exploitation). The latter is perhaps even more important than the former:…

We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden…

This paper investigates the problem of database-assisted spectrum access in dynamic TV white spectrum networks, in which the active user set is varying. Since there is no central controller and information exchange, it encounters dynamic…

We analyze best response dynamics for finding a Nash equilibrium of an infinite horizon zero-sum stochastic linear quadratic dynamic game (LQDG) with partial and asymmetric information. We derive explicit expressions for each player's best…

This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…

At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical framework to investigate advanced persistent threat problems with two types of insider threats: malicious and inadvertent. Within this framework, a unified three-player game is established and…

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy customized attacks by intelligent adversaries. This paper deals with the detection of APTs that infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or infrastructures.…

This paper studies cooperative control of noncooperative double-integrator multi-agent systems (MASs) with input delay on connected directed graphs in the context of a differential graphical game (DGG). In the distributed DGG, each agent…

Ensuring robust decision-making in multi-agent systems is challenging when agents have distinct, possibly conflicting objectives and lack full knowledge of each other's strategies. This is apparent in safety-critical applications such as…

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…

Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…

$ $This paper addresses the inverse problem for Linear-Quadratic (LQ) nonzero-sum $N$-player differential games, where the goal is to learn parameters of an unknown cost function for the game, called observed, given the demonstrated…

In this paper, we consider game problems played by (multi)-integrator agents, subject to external disturbances. We propose Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics based on gradient-play, augmented with a dynamic internal-model based component,…

A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash…

This paper studies the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games with coupling constraints, where each player optimizes its strategy depending on its local cost function and the estimated strategy…

We explore a scenario involving two sites and a sequential game between a defender and an attacker, where the defender is responsible for securing the sites while the attacker aims to attack them. Each site holds a loss value for the…

When people play a repeated game they usually try to anticipate their opponents' moves based on past observations, and then decide what action to take next. Behavioural economics studies the mechanisms by which strategic decisions are taken…

In this paper, we explore aggregative games over networks of multi-integrator agents with coupled constraints. To reach the general Nash equilibrium of an aggregative game, a distributed strategy-updating rule is proposed by a combination…