Related papers: Set Identification in Models with Multiple Equilib…
In this article, we provide an axiomatic characterization of feature attribution for multi-output predictors within the Shapley framework. While SHAP explanations are routinely computed independently for each output coordinate, the…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
A model for a Choquet integral for arbitrary finite set systems is presented. The model includes in particular the classical model on the system of all subsets of a finite set. The general model associates canonical non-negative and…
We consider fair and consistent extensions of the Shapley value for games with externalities. Based on the restriction identified by Casajus et al. (2024, Games Econ. Behavior 147, 88-146), we define balanced contributions, Sobolev's…
Shapley value is a classic notion from game theory, historically used to quantify the contributions of individuals within groups, and more recently applied to assign values to data points when training machine learning models. Despite its…
This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
We introduce Game networks (G nets), a novel representation for multi-agent decision problems. Compared to other game-theoretic representations, such as strategic or extensive forms, G nets are more structured and more compact; more…
Shapley values are great analytical tools in game theory to measure the importance of a player in a game. Due to their axiomatic and desirable properties such as efficiency, they have become popular for feature importance analysis in data…
Unsupervised anomaly detection is a challenging problem due to the diversity of data distributions and the lack of labels. Ensemble methods are often adopted to mitigate these challenges by combining multiple detectors, which can reduce…
Despite their ubiquitous use, Shapley value feature attributions can be misleading due to feature interaction in both model and data. We propose an alternative attribution approach, Shapley Sets, which awards value to sets of features.…
The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a…
A central task of artificial intelligence is the design of artificial agents that act towards specified goals in partially observed environments. Since such environments frequently include interaction over time with other agents with their…
Recent advances in game informatics have enabled us to find strong strategies across a diverse range of games. However, these strategies are usually difficult for humans to interpret. On the other hand, research in Explainable Artificial…
We propose a new model to detect the overlapping communities of a network that is based on cooperative games and mathematical programming. More specifically, communities are defined as stable coalitions of a weighted graph community game…
The assignment game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1971), is a classic model for two-sided matching markets between buyers and sellers. In the original assignment game, it is assumed that payments lead to transferable utility and that…
The Shapley value is a common tool in game theory to evaluate the importance of a player in a cooperative setting. In a geometric context, it provides a way to measure the contribution of a geometric object in a set towards some function on…
We investigate the distribution of the well-studied Shapley--Shubik values in weighted voting games where the agents are stochastically determined. The Shapley--Shubik value measures the voting power of an agent, in typical collective…
Structural Causal Models (SCM) are a powerful framework for describing complicated dynamics across the natural sciences. A particularly elegant way of interpreting SCMs is do-Shapley, a game-theoretic method of quantifying the average…