Related papers: Set Identification in Models with Multiple Equilib…
Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…
We study identification of preferences in static single-agent discrete choice models where decision makers may be imperfectly informed about the state of the world. We leverage the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium by…
For feature selection and related problems, we introduce the notion of classification game, a cooperative game, with features as players and hinge loss based characteristic function and relate a feature's contribution to Shapley value based…
This paper introduces an explicit algorithm for computing perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoffs in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, public randomization, and discounting. The method adapts the established framework by…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…
Nearly all simulation-based games have environment parameters that affect incentives in the interaction but are not explicitly incorporated into the game model. To understand the impact of these parameters on strategic incentives, typical…
Discrete statistical models supported on labelled event trees can be specified using so-called interpolating polynomials which are generalizations of generating functions. These admit a nested representation. A new algorithm exploits the…
Cooperative game theory has become a cornerstone of post-hoc interpretability in machine learning, largely through the use of Shapley values. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, Shapley-based methods often rest on axiomatic…
With the adoption of machine learning-based solutions in routine clinical practice, the need for reliable interpretability tools has become pressing. Shapley values provide local explanations. The method gained popularity in recent years.…
This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…
Equilibrium solution concepts of normal-form games, such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria, describe the joint strategy profiles from which no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate. They are…
The Shapley value is the prevalent solution for fair division problems in which a payout is to be divided among multiple agents. By adopting a game-theoretic view, the idea of fair division and the Shapley value can also be used in machine…
A quantitative assessment of the global importance of an agent in a team is as valuable as gold for strategists, decision-makers, and sports coaches. Yet, retrieving this information is not trivial since in a cooperative task it is hard to…
We propose probabilistic Shapley inference (PSI), a novel probabilistic framework to model and infer sufficient statistics of feature attributions in flexible predictive models, via latent random variables whose mean recovers Shapley…
AI algorithms for imperfect-information games are typically compared using performance metrics on individual games, making it difficult to assess robustness across game choices. Card games are a natural domain for imperfect information due…
To what extent can an external observer observing an equilibrium action distribution in an incomplete information game infer the underlying information structure? We investigate this issue in a general linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework. A…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…