Related papers: Nash Equilibria in Finite-Horizon Multiagent Concu…
Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…
Many real-world domains contain multiple agents behaving strategically with probabilistic transitions and uncertain (potentially infinite) duration. Such settings can be modeled as stochastic games. While algorithms have been developed for…
Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…
In this paper, we study finite-agent linear-quadratic games on graphs. Specifically, we propose a comprehensive framework that extends the existing literature by incorporating heterogeneous and interpretable player interactions. Compared to…
An open problem in linear quadratic (LQ) games has been characterizing the Nash equilibria. This problem has renewed relevance given the surge of work on understanding the convergence of learning algorithms in dynamic games. This paper…
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…
We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…
Multiagent learning settings are inherently more difficult than single-agent learning because each agent interacts with other simultaneously learning agents in a shared environment. An effective approach in multiagent reinforcement learning…
Finite-horizon linear quadratic (LQ) games admit a unique Nash equilibrium, while infinite-horizon settings may have multiple. We clarify the relationship between these two cases by interpreting the finite-horizon equilibrium as a nonlinear…
Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the…
Multiagent learning is a necessary yet challenging problem as multiagent systems become more prevalent and environments become more dynamic. Much of the groundbreaking work in this area draws on notable results from game theory, in…
Dynamic games provide a fundamental framework for multi-agent decision-making over time, yet computing feedback Nash equilibria (FNEs) in infinite-horizon discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) settings remains computationally challenging.…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
In this paper, we consider a Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a class of high-order multi-agent systems with unknown dynamics. Different from existing results for single integrators, we aim to steer the outputs of this class of…
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in…
In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem,…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
We study multi-strategies in multiplayer reachability games played on finite graphs. A multi-strategy prescribes a set of possible actions, instead of a single action as usual strategies: it represents a set of all strategies that are…