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We study sequential language games in which two players, each with private information, communicate to achieve a common goal. In such games, a successful player must (i) infer the partner's private information from the partner's messages,…
We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…
This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests…
Inspired by previous work on emergent communication in referential games, we propose a novel multi-modal, multi-step referential game, where the sender and receiver have access to distinct modalities of an object, and their information…
We consider a setting of non-cooperative communication where a receiver wants to recover randomly generated sequences of symbols that are observed by a strategic sender. The sender aims to maximize an average utility that may not align with…
Motivated by applications to word-of-mouth advertising, we consider a game-theoretic scenario in which competing advertisers want to target initial adopters in a social network. Each advertiser wishes to maximize the resulting cascade of…
When artificial agents are jointly trained to perform collaborative tasks using a communication channel, they develop opaque goal-oriented communication protocols. Good task performance is often considered sufficient evidence that…
How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…
We study discounted infinitely repeated games in which players agree on a cooperative mixed action profile but, at each step, observe only the realized pure actions. This form of imperfect monitoring breaks classical trigger strategies,…
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…
We all have preferences when multiple choices are available. If we insist on satisfying our preferences only, we may suffer a loss due to conflicts with other people's identical selections. Such a case applies when the choice cannot be…
The paper is concerned with distributed learning in large-scale games. The well-known fictitious play (FP) algorithm is addressed, which, despite theoretical convergence results, might be impractical to implement in large-scale settings due…
Crowdsourcing has emerged as a paradigm for leveraging human intelligence and activity to solve a wide range of tasks. However, strategic workers will find enticement in their self-interest to free-ride and attack in a crowdsourcing contest…
We consider the problem of decentralized constrained optimization with multiple agents $E_1,\ldots,E_N$ who jointly wish to learn the optimal solution set while keeping their feasible sets $\mathcal{P}_1,\ldots,\mathcal{P}_N$ private from…
Supervised learning models have been increasingly used for making decisions about individuals in applications such as hiring, lending, and college admission. These models may inherit pre-existing biases from training datasets and…
We construct a statistical ensemble of games, where in each independent subensemble we have two players playing the same game. We derive the mean payoffs per move of the representative players of the game, and we evaluate all the…
In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. We focus on \emph{acknowledgment-based} protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when she attempts transmission. In this case she…
We study an extension of the standard two-party communication model in which Alice and Bob hold probability distributions $p$ and $q$ over domains $X$ and $Y$, respectively. Their goal is to estimate \[ \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p,\, y \sim…
The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…
Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. The adversarial part of the environment is modeled by a player (Player 2) who tries to prevent the system (Player 1) from achieving its…