Related papers: Exponential Communication Separations between Noti…
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot…
An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network members: They should decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the trade-off between their perceived risk of being infected and…
Recent advances in multi-task peer prediction have greatly expanded our knowledge about the power of multi-task peer prediction mechanisms. Various mechanisms have been proposed in different settings to elicit different types of…
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies secure a decentralized consensus protocol by incentives. The protocol participants, called miners, generate (mine) a series of blocks, each containing monetary transactions created by system users. As…
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in repeated social interactions. According to this literature, individuals naturally learn to adopt conditionally cooperative strategies if they have multiple encounters…
We are interested in studying how heterogeneous agents can learn to communicate and cooperate with each other without being explicitly pre-programmed to do so. Motivated by this goal, we present and analyze a distributed solution to a…
A \emph{bidding} game is played on a graph as follows. A token is placed on an initial vertex and both players are allocated budgets. In each turn, the players simultaneously submit bids that do not exceed their available budgets, the…
We exhibit an $n$-bit partial function with randomized communication complexity $O(\log n)$ but such that any completion of this function into a total one requires randomized communication complexity $n^{\Omega(1)}$. In particular, this…
We give the first exponential separation between quantum and classical multi-party communication complexity in the (non-interactive) one-way and simultaneous message passing settings. For every k, we demonstrate a relational communication…
This work uses Game Theory to study the effectiveness of punishments as an incentive for rational nodes to follow an epidemic dissemination protocol. The dissemination process is modeled as an infinite repetition of a stage game. At the end…
We introduce new models and new information theoretic measures for the study of communication complexity in the natural peer-to-peer, multi-party, number-in-hand setting. We prove a number of properties of our new models and measures, and…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the public goods game is studied, where initially players belong to two independent structured populations. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players whose current utility…
Lifting theorems are one of the most powerful tools for proving communication lower bounds, with numerous downstream applications in proof complexity, monotone circuit lower bounds, data structures, and combinatorial optimization. However,…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which could be different from the player's belief) as a strategic…
In this paper, we consider a two-player two-strategy game with random payoffs in a population subdivided into $d$ demes, each containing $N$ individuals at the beginning of any given generation and experiencing local extinction and…
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…
We study the two-party communication complexity of functions with large outputs, and show that the communication complexity can greatly vary depending on what output model is considered. We study a variety of output models, ranging from the…
We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we…
Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own…