Related papers: Exponential Communication Separations between Noti…

We study which outcomes are implementable by disclosing coarse statistics of a data-generating process rather than its full distribution. Players observe data whose joint distribution is only partially known: they know the expectations of…

We consider protocols where users communicate with multiple servers to perform a computation on the users' data. An adversary exerts semi-honest control over many of the parties but its view is differentially private with respect to honest…

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…

We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq…

In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. In a recent work, we considered acknowledgment-based protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when she attempts transmission. In…

Learning to communicate through interaction, rather than relying on explicit supervision, is often considered a prerequisite for developing a general AI. We study a setting where two agents engage in playing a referential game and, from…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

Protocols for tossing a common coin play a key role in the vast majority of implementations of consensus. Even though the common coins in the literature are usually \emph{fair} (they have equal chance of landing heads or tails), we focus on…

Consider the "Number in Hand" multiparty communication complexity model, where k players holding inputs x_1,...,x_k in {0,1}^n communicate to compute the value f(x_1,...,x_k) of a function f known to all of them. The main lower bound…

The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in…

Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…

To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence…

Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…

In the inference attacks studied in Quantitative Information Flow (QIF), the attacker typically tries to interfere with the system in the attempt to increase its leakage of secret information. The defender, on the other hand, typically…

We investigate joint probabilistic choice rules describing the behavior of two decision makers, each facing potentially distinct menus. These rules are separable when they can be decomposed into individual choices correlated solely through…

Finding exponential separation between quantum and classical information tasks is like striking gold in quantum information research. Such an advantage is believed to hold for quantum computing but is proven for quantum communication…

We initiate the study of the communication complexity of fair division with indivisible goods. We focus on some of the most well-studied fairness notions (envy-freeness, proportionality, and approximations thereof) and valuation classes…

This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…

Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…

Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a…