Related papers: Local Dominance
We study the effect of strategic behavior in iterative voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein (2014)'s local dominance theory and…
From the standpoint of game theory, dominoes is a game that has not received much attention (specially the variety known as draw). It is usually thought that this game is already solved, given general results in game theory. However, the…
We study variants of regular infinite games where the strict alternation of moves between the two players is subject to modifications. The second player may postpone a move for a finite number of steps, or, in other words, exploit in his…
We propose a novel model to explain the mechanisms underlying dominance hierarchical structures. Guided by a predetermined social convention, agents with limited cognitive abilities optimize their strategies in a Hawk-Dove game. We find…
Probabilistic game structures combine both nondeterminism and stochasticity, where players repeatedly take actions simultaneously to move to the next state of the concurrent game. Probabilistic alternating simulation is an important tool to…
Individuals accepting an idea may intentionally or unintentionally impose influences in a certain neighborhood area, making other individuals within the area less likely or even impossible to accept other competing ideas. Depending on…
We consider a version of the ultimatum game which simultaneously combines reactive and Darwinian aspects with offers in [0,1]. By reactive aspects, we consider the effects that lead the player to change their offer given the previous…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is…
In the naming game, individuals or agents exchange pairwise local information in order to communicate about objects in their common environment. The goal of the game is to reach a consensus about naming these objects. Originally used to…
We consider local leaders in random uncorrelated networks, i.e. nodes whose degree is higher or equal than the degree of all of their neighbors. An analytical expression is found for the probability of a node of degree $k$ to be a local…
We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL…
High-dimensional systems that have a low-dimensional dominant behavior allow for model reduction and simplified analysis. We use differential analysis to formalize this important concept in a nonlinear setting. We show that dominance can be…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
The idea of incompetence as a learning or adaptation function was introduced in the context of evolutionary games as a fixed parameter. However, live organisms usually perform different nonlinear adaptation functions such as a power law or…
Inspired by the fact that human brains can emphasize discriminative parts of the input and suppress irrelevant ones, substantial local mechanisms have been designed to boost the development of computer vision. They can not only focus on…
In a game of incomplete information, an infinite state space can create problems. When the space is uncountably large, the strategy spaces of the players may be unwieldly, resulting in a lack of measurable equilibria. When the knowledge of…
Notion of strategy in game theory is static and presumably constructed before the game play. The static, pre-determined notion of strategies falls short analyzing perfect information games. Because, we, people, do not strategize as such…
We compare games under delayed control and delay games, two types of infinite games modelling asynchronicity in reactive synthesis. In games under delayed control both players suffer from partial informedness due to symmetrically delayed…
Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes: one player represents the controller, trying to ensure a given specification, and the other represents a hostile environment. The evolution of the system…