Related papers: Local Dominance
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
We consider (random) strategic interactions in a large population consisting of a variety of players. A rational player chooses actions that maximize certain utility functions, while a behavioral player chooses actions based on preferences…
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…
We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…
Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…
We study a modified version of the Naming Game, a recently introduced model which describes how shared vocabulary can emerge spontaneously in a population without any central control. In particular, we introduce a new mechanism that allows…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
The concept of power among players can be expressed as a combination of their utilities. A player who obeys another takes into account the utility of the dominant one. Technically it is a matter of superimposing some weighted sum or product…
The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…
We consider a version of large population games whose players compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime where the system can be…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we…
This work explores dynamics existing in interactions between players. The dynamic system of games is a new attitude to modeling in which an event is modeled using several games. The model allows us to analyze the interplay capabilities and…
Elementary decision-theoretic analysis of the Monty Hall dilemma shows that the problem has dominance. This makes possible to discard nonswitching strategies, without making any assumptions on the prior distribution of factors out of…
How do competing populations convert a spatial advantage into macroscopic dominance? We introduce a stochastic model for resource competition that decouples the transient discovery phase from monopolization. Initial symmetry breaking is…
We use ideas from distributed computing and game theory to study dynamic and decentralized environments in which computational nodes, or decision makers, interact strategically and with limited information. In such environments, which arise…
Patterns of wins and losses in pairwise contests, such as occur in sports and games, consumer research and paired comparison studies, and human and animal social hierarchies, are commonly analyzed using probabilistic models that allow one…
Dominance is a fundamental concept in game theory. In normal-form games dominated strategies can be identified in polynomial time. As a consequence, iterative removal of dominated strategies can be performed efficiently as a preprocessing…
Dominance is usually considered a constant value that describes the relative difference in fitness or phenotype between heterozygotes and the average of homozygotes at a focal polymorphic locus. However, the observed dominance can vary with…
We study two-player games on finite graphs. Turn-based games have many nice properties, but concurrent games are harder to tame: e.g. turn-based stochastic parity games have positional optimal strategies, whereas even basic concurrent…