Related papers: Stability Analysis of Nash Equilibrium for 2-Agent…
We investigate both stationary and time-varying, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems that exhibit symmetric interactions among the agents, which are known to be potential. As may happen in practical cases, however, we envision…
We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several…
We investigate stochastic utility maximization games under relative performance concerns in both finite-agent and infinite-agent (graphon) settings. An incomplete market model is considered where agents with power (CRRA) utility functions…
Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the…
In multi-agent dynamic games, the Nash equilibrium state trajectory of each agent is determined by its cost function and the information pattern of the game. However, the cost and trajectory of each agent may be unavailable to the other…
This paper considers data-based solutions of linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differential games. Two cases are considered. First, the deterministic game is solved and Nash equilibrium strategies are obtained by using persistently excited data…
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…
This paper studies a class of zero-sum stopping game in a regime switching model. A verification theorem as a sufficient criterion for Nash equilibriums is established based on a set of variational inequalities (VIs). Under an appropriate…
In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding utilities, an equilibrium is a configuration where no agent can improve their utility by unilaterally switching to a different action. In…
This paper models a two-agent economy with production and appropriation as a noncooperative dynamic game, and determines its closed-form Markovian Nash equilibrium. The analysis highlights the para-metric conditions that tip the economy…
We address learning Nash equilibria in convex games under the payoff information setting. We consider the case in which the game pseudo-gradient is monotone but not necessarily strictly monotone. This relaxation of strict monotonicity…
This paper studies a stochastic utility maximization game under relative performance concerns in finite agent and infinite agent settings, where a continuum of agents interact through a graphon (see definition below). We consider an…
We undertake a fundamental study of network equilibria modeled as solutions of fixed point equations for monotone linear functions with saturation nonlinearities. The considered model extends one originally proposed to study systemic risk…
This paper studies the global Nash equilibrium problem of leader-follower multi-agent dynamics, which yields consensus with a privacy information encrypted learning algorithm. With the secure hierarchical structure, the relationship between…
We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…
In this paper, we propose a passivity-based methodology for analysis and design of reinforcement learning in multi-agent finite games. Starting from a known exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning scheme, we show that convergence to…
A multi-dimensional switched system or multi-mode multi-dimensional ($M^3D$) system extends the classic switched system by allowing different subsystem dimensions. The stability problem of the $M^3D$ system, whose state transitions at…
In this paper we consider non zero-sum games where multiple players control the drift of a process, and their payoffs depend on its ergodic behaviour. We establish their connection with systems of Ergodic BSDEs, and prove the existence of a…
We consider a two-player linear-state differential game, where one player intervenes continuously in the game, while the other implements an impulse control. When the impulse instants are exogenous, we obtain the classical result in…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…