Related papers: Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games with …
We consider a facility location problem, where the objective is to ``disperse'' a number of facilities, i.e., select a given number k of locations from a discrete set of n candidates, such that the average distance between selected…
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…
Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior. A growing literature, however, suggests that people do not quite behave like standard economic agents in a…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the problem of designing truthful budget feasible mechanisms for…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…
We introduce a novel family of mechanisms for constrained allocation problems which we call local priority mechanisms. These mechanisms are parameterized by a function which assigns a set of agents, the local compromisers, to every…
In the symmetric rendezvous problem two players follow the same (randomized) strategy to visit one of $n$ locations in each time step $t=0,1,2,\dots$. Their goal is to minimize the expected time until they visit the same location and thus…
Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition formation in…
We propose a game theoretic approach to address the problem of searching for available parking spots in a parking lot and picking the ``optimal'' one to park. The approach exploits limited information provided by the parking lot, i.e., its…
This paper considers facility location problems in which a firm entering a market seeks to open facilities on a subset of candidate locations so as to maximize its expected market share, assuming that customers choose the available…
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where $n$ selfish agents install facilities over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed by a non-negative weight per agent). Agents using the…
The augmentation of algorithms with predictions of the optimal solution, such as from a machine-learning algorithm, has garnered significant attention in recent years, particularly in facility location problems. Moving beyond the…
We address the problem of strategyproof (SP) facility location mechanisms on discrete trees. Our main result is a full characterization of onto and SP mechanisms. In particular, we prove that when a single agent significantly affects the…
In budget-feasible mechanism design, a buyer wishes to procure a set of items of maximum value from self-interested players. We have a valuation function $v:2^U \to \mathbb{R}_+$, where $U$ is the set of all items, where $v(S)$ specifies…
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent is the best that she can guarantee to herself, if she would…
Given facilities with capacities and clients with penalties and demands, the transportation problem with market choice consists in finding the minimum-cost way to partition the clients into unserved clients, paying the penalties, and into…
We consider a scenario consisting of a set of heterogeneous mobile agents located at a depot, and a set of tasks dispersed over a geographic area. The agents are partitioned into different types. The tasks are partitioned into specialized…
In this paper, we study a problem of truthful mechanism design for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and prior-free environment. In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a…