Related papers: Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games with …
We study the online facility location problem with uniform facility costs in the random-order model. Meyerson's algorithm [FOCS'01] is arguably the most natural and simple online algorithm for the problem with several advantages and…
Many scenarios where agents with restrictions compete for resources can be cast as maximum matching problems on bipartite graphs. Our focus is on resource allocation problems where agents may have restrictions that make them incompatible…
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of…
Strategic product placement can have a strong influence on customer purchase behavior in physical stores as well as online platforms. Motivated by this, we consider the problem of optimizing the placement of substitutable products in…
We first show that a better analysis of the algorithm for The Two-Sage Stochastic Facility Location Problem from Srinivasan \cite{sri07} and the algorithm for The Robust Fault Tolerant Facility Location Problem from Byrka et al \cite{bgs10}…
In this paper, we study a facility location problem within a competitive market context, where customer demand is predicted by a random utility choice model. Unlike prior research, which primarily focuses on simple constraints such as a…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
Consider a principal who wants to search through a space of stochastic solutions for one maximizing their utility. If the principal cannot conduct this search on their own, they may instead delegate this problem to an agent with distinct…
We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal is…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
Mobile edge computing (MEC) is a promising technique for providing low-latency access to services at the network edge. The services are hosted at various types of edge nodes with both computation and communication capabilities. Due to the…
Consider the following social choice problem. Suppose we have a set of $n$ voters and $m$ candidates that lie in a metric space. The goal is to design a mechanism to choose a candidate whose average distance to the voters is as small as…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
We study a joint facility location and cost planning problem in a competitive market under random utility maximization (RUM) models. The objective is to locate new facilities and make decisions on the costs (or budgets) to spend on the new…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…
This paper presents a distributed O(1)-approximation algorithm, with expected-$O(\log \log n)$ running time, in the $\mathcal{CONGEST}$ model for the metric facility location problem on a size-$n$ clique network. Though metric facility…